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innovations into . . . criminal procedure”1 in England and Wales.2 Among
other things, in a trial upon an indictment,3 the Act grants the prosecution the
right to appeal certain rulings of the trial judge.4 This includes the right to
appeal a ruling that the defendant has no case to answer5 because the
prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt,6 i.e., a directed verdict of not guilty.7 If the prosecution’s
appeal succeeds, the Act allows the reviewing court to reverse the trial judge’s
ruling8 and order either that the defendant’s trial be resumed or that he or she
be tried a second time for the same offense.9 Before the Act’s effective date, a
trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer in a trial upon an indictment would
have ended the case permanently in favor of the accused.10 The ruling would
have constituted an acquittal and prosecutors in England had no right to
appeal,11 and would effectively have precluded from bringing a new charge for
1. Ian Dennis, Prosecution Appeals and Retrials for Serious Offences, 2004 CRIM. L.R.
619, 619.
2. Although England and Wales are separate countries, for the sake of convenience, this
Article refers to “England” as encompassing both England and Wales.
3. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (Eng.).
4. Id. §§ 57(1), 58(2). The prosecution may bring an appeal only with the leave of the trial
judge or the Court of Appeal. Id. § 57(4).
5. Id. § 58(1)–(2), (7) (providing that, if “the ruling [being appealed by the prosecution is]
a ruling that there is no case to answer,” the prosecution can also appeal other rulings related to
the offense that is subject to the appeal).
6. See R v. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1223, [15] (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/1223.html; see also ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL
PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE § 4-293 (J.P. Richardson ed., 2011) [hereinafter
ARCHBOLD] (“A submission of no case should be allowed when there is no evidence upon which,
if the evidence adduced were accepted, a reasonable jury, properly directed, could convict.”).
7. N. Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Crim) at [15]; JOHN SPRACK, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.52 (13th ed. 2011); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF
CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1983). A submission of no case to answer normally should be made
at the close of the prosecution’s case in chief. ARCHBOLD, supra note 6, § 4-292; SPRACK, supra,
§ 20.48. Nevertheless, in “exceptional case[s],” it is possible for a judge to consider a submission
of no case to answer at the close of a defense case, or to decide on his or her own that there is no
case to answer should the defendant fail to make the claim. R v. Collins, [2007] EWCA (Crim)
854, [47] (Eng.) (citing R v. Speechley, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 3067, [53] (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/crim/2004/3067.html), available at http://www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWCA/crim/2009/854.html.
8. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(1).
9. Id. § 61(4)(a)–(b).
10. Criminal Justice Act, 2003 (Commencement No. 8 and Transitional and Saving
Provisions) Order, 2005, S.I. 2005/950, art. 2(1) (Eng.) (noting that the Act’s provisions that
allow the prosecution to appeal certain rulings of the trial judge took effect on April 4, 2005).
11. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19 (Eng.) (making no provision for an appeal by the
prosecution of an acquittal in a trial on an indictment); see also THE LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156: DOUBLE JEOPARDY paras. 2.11–.13 (1999) [hereinafter ENG.
LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156] (noting that, “[i]n general[,] the prosecution has
no right of appeal against an acquittal”); THE LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267: DOUBLE
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the same offense by the plea of autrefois acquit.12 As one eighteenth century
English defense lawyer put it: “[W]henever, and by whatever means, there is
an acquittal in a criminal prosecution, the scene is closed and the curtain
drops.”13
The Act significantly changes English criminal procedure by allowing the
retrial of an individual for the same offense, or allowing his or her aborted trial
to resume, following a prosecutor’s successful appeal of a trial judge’s ruling
of no case to answer.14 According to the English Law Commission, however,
the second trial of the accused for the same offense, or the resumption of the
initial trial, does not violate the double jeopardy rule,15 which prohibits a
person from being tried twice for the same offense.16 The autrefois rule17 and
JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTION APPEALS para. 2.38 (2001) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N,
REPORT NO. 267] (“[T]he main business of the Crown Court, trying cases on indictment, is
subject to a defence right of appeal only . . . .” (emphasis added)).
Although the Attorney General can refer a point of law to the Court of Appeal, such a reference
does “not affect the trial in relation to which the reference is made or any acquittal in that trial.”
Criminal Justice Act, 1972, c. 71, § 36(1), (7) (Eng.).
12. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *335. The plea of autrefois acquit (a
former acquittal) is a special plea in bar that “give[s] a reason why the prisoner ought not to
answer [the indictment] at all, nor put himself upon his trial for the crime alleged.” Id. The plea
can be raised not only to an indictment for the same offense of which an individual previously has
been acquitted, but also to an indictment for an offense that the individual, on a previous
indictment, could have been convicted. Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.) 1305 (Lord
Morris of Borth-y-Gest) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267,
supra note 11, para. 2.2 (outlining the doctrines of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict). In
practice, however, second prosecutions are not brought and therefore do not reach court.
SPRACK, supra note 7, § 17.43. The plea, expressed in Norman-French, is spelled in various
ways. In this Article, the Author will use the spelling autrefois acquit, except when quoting
material using a different spelling.
13. Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 528 (1776).
14. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
15. THE LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158: PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST
JUDGES’ RULINGS para. 1.9 (2000) [hereinafter ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO.
158].
16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 564 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S] (defining
double jeopardy as “[t]he fact of being prosecuted or sentenced twice for substantially the same
offense”).
17. See ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.2. The autrefois rule,
comprising the pleas of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal) and autrefois convict (a former
conviction), provides that no one may be tried twice for the same offense, and that when the
defendant has been acquitted or convicted (or could have been convicted) of an offense, the
autrefois plea will bar a subsequent prosecution for that offense. Id. Both pleas, Blackstone
explained, are based upon the English common law maxim that “no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life, more than once for the same offence.” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at
*335.
Recent legislation in England allows an acquittal to be quashed in certain circumstances
and permits the prosecution to retry the previously acquitted individual. Criminal Justice Act,
2003, c. 44, § 76(1)–(4) (Eng.). Once the acquittal is quashed, the individual cannot raise the plea

94

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:91

the “special application of the abuse of process rules”18—the two components
of the protection against double jeopardy in England—merely “prevent a final
acquittal or conviction from being re-opened.”19 An acquittal entered by a trial
judge before the jury has considered the evidence is not considered final.20
England is not alone in this position. Countries, or states therein, that
recognize the rule against double jeopardy21 generally allow the prosecution to

of autrefois acquit. See id. §§ 75–78 (permitting the Court of Appeal to quash an acquittal for
certain serious offenses when “there is new and compelling evidence against the acquitted
person”); see also Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25, §§ 54–57 (Eng.)
(permitting the High Court of Justice to quash an acquittal that was “tainted”).
18. See ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.14. Under the abuse
of process rules, the trial judge has “the discretion to stay proceedings which would be an abuse
of the process of the court” when there has been an acquittal or conviction “on the same or
substantially the same facts.” Id. para. 2.1; accord Connelly v. D.P.P., [1964] A.C. 1254 (H.L.)
1340 (Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.); id. at 1306–07 (Lord Morris of Borth-yGest); id. at 1296 (Lord Reid); id. at 1362–68 (Lord Pearce); Criminal Justice Act, 2003,
Explanatory Notes ¶ 1(40) (detailing the changes in the law relating to double jeopardy). For a
discussion of the abuse of process rules, see ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note
11, para. 2.14.
19. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 15, para. 1.8; accord
ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 2.1 (finding that the autrefois rule
precludes a second trial only where a final conviction or acquittal was rendered).
20. See ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 7.22 (explaining that an
acquittal arising from a pre-trial terminating ruling can be appealed).
21. See MODEL CRIMINAL CODE OFFICERS’ COMM. OF THE STANDING COMM. OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, CH. 2: ISSUE ESTOPPEL,
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, AND PROSECUTION APPEALS AGAINST ACQUITTALS 1 n.5 (2003)
[hereinafter AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER] (finding that the rule has
constitutional merit in numerous countries); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the
Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 288 (1993) (finding the
concept of double jeopardy in many countries, but noting that its interpretation and application
varies); Gerald Conway, Ne Bis in Idem in International Law, 3 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 217, 217
(2003) (discussing the maxim ne bis in idem, otherwise known as double jeopardy, and its
prevalence in legal systems around the world). There are over fifty nations whose constitutions
contain a double jeopardy provision. See Bassiouni, supra, at 289 & n.262; see also, e.g., Pearce
v The Queen, (1998) 194 CLR 610, 623 (Austl.) (discussing Australia’s double jeopardy rule);
Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 11(h) (U.K.) (providing that, in Canada, “[a]ny person charged with an
offence has the right . . . if finally found acquitted of the offence, not to be tried for it again, and if
finally found guilty and punished for the offence, not to be tried or punished for it again”); INDIA
CONST. art. 20, § 2 (“No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than
once.”); New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, § 26(2) (N.Z.) (“No one who has been finally
acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again.”); S.
AFR. CONST., 1996 § 35(3)(m) (“Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes
the right . . . not to be tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that person
has previously been either acquitted or convicted . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person
shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
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challenge at least some acquittals by way of appeal.22 Many of these countries
and states trace their legal heritage to England,23 including the Australian states
of New South Wales, Tasmania, and Western Australia.24
22. See Alejandro D. Carrió & Alejandro M. Garro, Argentina, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A
WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 51–52 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007) [hereinafter A WORLDWIDE
STUDY];
see
also
Valérie
Dervieux,
revised
by
Mikaël
Benillouche
& Olivier Bachelet, The French System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 218, 274
(Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R. Spencer eds. 2002) [hereinafter EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES]; Richard S. Frase, France, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra, at 218; Catherine
Newcombe, Russia, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra, at 397, 461–63; Antoinette Perrodet,
revised by Elena Ricci, The Italian System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES, supra, at 348,
399; Brigitte Pesquié, revised by Yves Cartuyvels, The Belgian System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURES, supra, at 99–100, 130–31; Miguel Sarré & Ian Perlin, Mexico, in A WORLDWIDE
STUDY, supra, at 351, 389–90; A.H.J. Swart, The Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 279, 314 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed. 1993).
The European Convention on Human Rights recognizes the rule against double jeopardy, but
nevertheless permits the prosecution to have rights of appeal. Article 4(1) of that Convention
provides: “No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the
jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or
convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.” Protocol No. 7 to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4, opened for
signature Nov. 22, 1984, C.E.T.S. No. 117 (entered into force Jan. 11, 1988) (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (Can.); Act 1961, §§ 380(1),
(3)–(4), 381, 381A (N.Z.); Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Israel, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 22,
at 273, 298–99; P.J. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, South Africa, in A WORLDWIDE STUDY,
supra note 22, at 471, 515.
24. New South Wales and Tasmania recognize a plea of former acquittal or former
conviction. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 156(1) (Austl.); Criminal Code Act 1924
(Tas) sch 1, s 355(1)(b) (Austl.). The Western Australia Criminal Code provides that “[i]t is a
defence to a charge of any offence to show that the accused person has already been tried, and
convicted or acquitted upon an indictment or prosecution notice on which he might have been
convicted of the offence with which he is charged, or has already been convicted or acquitted of
an offence of which he might be convicted upon the indictment or prosecution notice on which he
is charged.” Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) app. B, s 17 (Austl.). Each of these
states nevertheless allows the prosecution to appeal some acquittals. In New South Wales, the
prosecution can appeal an acquittal by a jury at the direction of the trial judge. Crimes (Appeal
and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 107(1)(a), (2) (Austl.); see also, e.g., R v R.K., [2008] NSWCCA
338, [1]–[2], [70], [73]–[75], [77]–[79] (Austl.) (upholding the trial judge’s decision to direct the
jury to return a verdict of not guilty). The prosecution can also appeal an acquittal by the judge
sitting without a jury in a trial of an indictable offense. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 s
107(1)(b), (2). Such an appeal, however, is restricted to questions of law. Id. s 107(2). If the
Court of Appeal finds the trial judge committed error, it may quash the acquittal and order a new
trial. Id. s 107(5)–(6).
Tasmania allows the Attorney-General, with leave of the Court of Criminal Appeal or upon the
certificate of the trial judge that it is a fit case for appeal, to appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal “against an acquittal on a question of law” in a trial upon an indictment. Criminal Code
Act 1924 sch. 1, s 401(2). If the Court of Appeal finds either that the verdict of the jury was
unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, that the trial court reached the wrong
decision on a question of law, or that there was a miscarriage of justice, it can set aside the verdict
or judgment, allow the appeal, and either enter a conviction or order a new trial. Id. sch 1, s
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These common law jurisdictions authorizing prosecutorial appeals of some
acquittals typically permit an appeal of a trial judge’s directed verdict of not
guilty25 and provide that, if the appeal is successful, the government can retry
the accused.26 In the United States, however, neither the federal government
nor any state expressly authorizes the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s
directed verdict of not guilty or its equivalent.27 At least one reason for this
may be that legislatures assume that a provision authorizing such an appeal
would not pass muster under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment28 because it would lead to a second trial of the
defendant for the same offense. This Article will examine that assumption and
attempt to answer the question of whether a provision similar to that contained
402(1), (5)(b)–(c); see also, e.g., R v Pirimona, [1998] TASSC 136 (Austl.) (ordering a retrial
after setting aside a verdict of acquittal entered by direction of the trial judge); R v Jenkins, [1970]
Tas SR 13, 24 (Austl.) (Crisp, J.) (setting aside the defendant’s acquittal and ordering a new trial
because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence); id. at 27 (Neasey, J.); id. at 30 (Chambers, J.).
In Western Australia, the prosecution, “in relation to a charge of an indictable offence,” and with
the leave of the Court of Appeal, can appeal “a judgment of acquittal . . . entered after a jury’s
verdict of not guilty of a charge the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment for 14
years or more or life, but only on the grounds that before or during the trial the judge made an
error of fact or law in relation to the charge.” Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) ss 24(2),
24(2)(da), 27(1). Appeals can also be filed against “a judgment of acquittal . . . entered in a trial
by the judge alone,” or “entered after a decision by the judge that the accused has no case to
answer on the charge.” Id. s 24(2)(e)(i)–(ii). If the Court of Appeal finds in favor of the
prosecution, it can set aside the acquittal and order a new trial. Id. s 33(1), (2)(a); see also, e.g.,
State v Tilbrook, [2007] WASCA 4, [1], [40]–[42] (Austl.) (ordering a new trial after setting aside
judgments of acquittal entered by the trial judge who had found that the defendants did not have a
case to answer).
25. See, e.g., Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 107(1)(a), (2) (Austl.); Crimes
Act 1961, § 381A (N.Z.); Rowbotham v. The Queen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 463, 474–75 (Can.)
(interpreting Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (Can.)); see also Criminal Appeals
Act 2004 (WA) s 24(2)(e)(i) (permitting a prosecutor to appeal a judgment of acquittal); Jenkins,
[1970] Tas SR at 16 (indicating that the Criminal Code Act 1924 sch 1, s 401(2) allows the
prosecution to appeal a directed verdict of acquittal).
26. E.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 686(4)(b)(i) (Can.); Crimes (Appeal and
Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 107(5)–(6); Crimes Act 1961, § 382(2)(b) (N.Z.); Criminal Code Act
1924 (Tas) sch 1, s 402(5)(c); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 33(1)–(2)(a).
27. Many jurisdictions in the United States have substituted, for a directed verdict of not
guilty, the functionally equivalent court-ordered judgment of acquittal. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM.
P. 29(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West 2004); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
25(a). For the sake of convenience, this Article uses the terms “directed verdict of not guilty,”
“court-ordered acquittal,” and “required finding of not guilty” interchangeably.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”). It is possible that because so few directed verdicts of not guilty
are rendered in a particular jurisdiction that the legislature does not perceive the possibility of a
significant number of erroneous directed verdicts to be a problem worth its time and effort. See 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.8(i) n.110 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that, in
most jurisdictions, statistics show directed verdicts are not granted in many cases (citing HARRY
KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 508 (1966))).
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in England’s Criminal Justice Act 2003 would be constitutional in the United
States.
This Article will proceed as follows: Part I details England’s Criminal
Justice Act 2003 and demonstrates how the Act works in practice. Part II
discusses the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, specifically
the Double Jeopardy Clause and significant Supreme Court jurisprudence
interpreting it. Part III examines the implications of implementing the Act in
the United States through a statute or court rule. Part III also analyzes the
effect of such a statute or court rule by applying existing Supreme Court
precedent and considering the policies that led to the Double Jeopardy Clause’s
drafting. Part IV concludes that such a statute or court rule would thwart the
policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause and, therefore, an
implementation of the Act in the United States would not survive constitutional
scrutiny.
I. THE ENGLISH MODEL
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 grants the prosecution, in a trial upon an
indictment,29 the right to appeal30 to the Court of Appeal.31 After obtaining
leave to do so,32 the prosecution may appeal certain rulings of the trial judge,
including a ruling that the defendant has no case to answer.33 The prosecution
29. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 57(1), 58(1) (Eng.). A trial on an indictment takes
place in the Crown Court. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 46(1) (Eng.). References to a
“judge” in the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 discussed herein are “to a judge of the
Crown Court.” Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 74(2).
30. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, §§ 57(1), 58(2).
31. Id. § 57(3).
32. Id. § 57(4) (stating that such leave must be obtained from either the trial judge or the
Court of Appeal). Under the Criminal Procedure Rules adopted pursuant to the Act, if the
prosecution seeks leave to appeal from the trial judge, it must do so by applying either orally
following the contested ruling or in writing should it receive an adjournment. See Criminal
Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(a)–(b) (Eng.). When the prosecution seeks leave
to appeal from the trial judge, the trial judge must decide whether to grant leave on the day of its
application. Id. 67.5(4). In deciding whether to allow leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal, and
presumably the trial judge, should consider the fair interests of justice rather than simply looking
at the case’s merits and prospect of success. R v. Al-Ali, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 2186, [8], [2009]
1 W.L.R. 1661, 1663 (Eng.).
33. The Act does not list the specific types of rulings the prosecution can appeal; rather, it
provides that “[t]he prosecution may appeal in respect of the ruling in accordance with this
section,” which applies to “ruling[s made by] a judge . . . in relation to a trial on
indictment . . . [where] the ruling relates to one or more offences included in the indictment.”
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(1)–(2). The Act characterizes a “ruling” to include “a decision,
determination, direction, finding, notice, order, refusal, rejection or requirement.” Id. § 74(1). It
is clear, however, that the prosecution can appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer. Id.
§ 58(7) (providing that if “the ruling [being appealed by the prosecution] is a ruling that there is
no case to answer,” the prosecution also can appeal other rulings related to the offense); id.
§ 61(6) – (8) (dealing with situations in which “the appeal relates to a ruling that there is no case
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can appeal such a ruling only if, “immediately after the ruling,”34 it “informs
the court that it intends to appeal”35 or, alternatively, “immediately after the
ruling”36 it requests an adjournment37 and, if one is granted,38 it “informs the
court following the adjournment that it intends to appeal.”39 The prosecution
may not inform the court that it intends to appeal, however, “unless, at or
before that time,”40 it also informs the court that it agrees that the defendant
should be acquitted of the offense in question if either leave to appeal is not
obtained or the prosecution abandons its appeal before the Court of Appeal
determines it.41
When “the prosecution informs the court . . . that it intends to appeal, the
[trial] judge must decide whether . . . the appeal should be expedited.”42 If the
judge determines that the appeal should be expedited, he or she can order an
to answer and one or more other rulings”); R v. G.S., [2012] EWCA (Crim) 398, [1], [4], [28],
2012 WL 1015871, at *156 (Eng.) (allowing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to
answer); R v. Q., [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1584, [1], [20], [2011] 2 Crim. App. 25, [365], [369]
(Eng.) (considering and dismissing the prosecution’s appeal of a ruling of no case to answer); R
v. P., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 2895, [1], [32], 2010 WL 4955747 (Eng.) (dismissing an appeal of a
ruling of no case to answer).
34. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.2(1)(a). Accord R v. Mian, [2012]
EWCA (Crim) 792, [8], 2012 WL 1357999, at *106 (Eng.) (“[T]his court [has] made it clear that
‘immediately’ in rule 67.2(1)(a) of the [Criminal Procedure] Rules means ‘immediately’ and that
it is a correct interpretation of the requirement of the 2003 Act itself.”); R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA
(Crim) 711, [13], 2010 WL 910162 (Eng.) (stating that the use of the word “immediately” is a
direct reflection of legislative intent that courts are informed of an intent to appeal).
35. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(i).
36. Criminal Procedure Rules, 67.2(2)(a); accord Mian, [2012] EWCA (Crim) 792, [28],
2012 WL 1357999, at *112 (“It is clear that . . . an adjournment must be sought immediately
. . . .”); see also supra note 34.
37. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(ii).
38. See id. § 58(5). The judge normally should grant a request for an adjournment.
Criminal Procedure Rules, 67.2(2)(b). It also indicates that the adjournment generally should last
only one day. Id. But see R v. H., [2008] EWCA (Crim) 483, [10]–[12], 2008 WL 576851 (Eng.)
(holding that the court has the power to grant longer adjournments).
39. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(b). If the prosecution informs the court that it
intends to appeal a ruling, the proceedings may continue with respect to any offense that is not the
subject of the appeal. Id. § 60.
40. Id. § 58(8).
41. Id. § 58(8)–(9). The prosecution’s agreement to this effect has been labeled an
“acquittal agreement” or an “acquittal undertaking.” See, e.g., Mian, [2012] EWCA (Crim) 792,
[9], 2012 WL 1357999, at *107 (classifying the agreement as an “acquittal agreement”); R v. B.
& T., [2009] EWCA (Crim) 99, [14], [23], 2009 WL 289371 (Eng.) (characterizing the agreement
as an “acquittal undertaking”). If the prosecution does not undertake an “acquittal agreement” “at
or before” the time it informs the court it intends to appeal a ruling, the prosecution cannot
appeal. R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [18] 2010 WL 91062 (Eng.); CPS v. C., [2009]
EWCA (Crim) 2614, [40]–[41], 2009 WL 4666893 (Eng.).
42. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(1). The prosecution must request an expedited appeal
and provide reasons for its request. Criminal Procedure Rules, 67.6(1).
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adjournment of the trial.43 If, on the other hand, the judge determines that the
appeal should not be expedited, he or she can either order an adjournment of
the trial44 or discharge the jury if one has been empaneled.45
A ruling by the trial judge has no effect during the period in which the
prosecution can inform the court that it intends to appeal the ruling,46 nor
during the pendency of any appeal it decides to pursue.47 In addition, the
ruling’s consequences have no effect48 and “the [trial] judge may not take any
steps in consequence of the ruling.”49
On appeal,50 “the Court of Appeal may confirm, reverse[,] or vary [the trial
judge’s] ruling.”51 It may not, however, reverse a ruling unless satisfied that
the ruling either “was wrong in law,” “involved an error in law or principle,”
or “was a ruling that was not reasonable for the judge to have made.”52 If the
ruling is confirmed, the Court of Appeal must acquit the defendant of the
offense or offenses in question.53 If the court reverses or varies the ruling, it
must, with respect to each offense in question, either allow proceedings for the
offense to resume54 or allow for a new trial.55 If, though, the court determines
that the defendant could not receive a fair trial were the original trial resumed
or a new trial initiated,56 the court must acquit the defendant of the offense in
question.57 The decision of the Court of Appeal can, with leave,58 be appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom by either the defendant or the
prosecution.59
43. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 59(2).
44. Id. § 59(3)(a).
45. Id. § 59(3)(b).
46. Id. § 58(3)–(4).
47. Id. § 58(10).
48. Id. § 58(11)(a).
49. Id. § 58(11)(b). Should the trial judge take any steps in consequence of the ruling, those
steps are to have no effect. Id. § 58(11)(c).
50. Id. § 58(12). If the prosecution does not obtain leave to appeal, or if it abandons the
appeal before the Court of Appeal makes a determination, the defendant must be acquitted of the
offense in question. Id.
51. Id. § 61(1).
52. Id. § 67.
53. Id. § 61(3), (6)–(7).
54. Id. § 61(4)(a); see also id. § 61(6), (8) (addressing appeals to additional rulings).
55. Id. § 61(4)(b).
56. Id. § 61(5).
57. Id. § 61(4)(c); see also id. § 61(8).
58. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(2) (Eng.). Leave to appeal must be obtained
from either the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Id. To be granted,
the Court of Appeal must certify that the case involves “a point of law of general public
importance” and, in addition, it must appear to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court (as the
case may be) that the point is one that “ought to be considered.” Id.
59. Id. § 33(1), as amended by Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 68(1).
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II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person
shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb.”60 More than a half-century ago, in Green v. United States,61 the
Supreme Court articulated the overall design of this provision. The Court
stated:
The constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards
of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense. . . .
...
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity,
as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he
may be found guilty.62
The prohibition against double jeopardy contained in the Fifth Amendment is
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice.”63 As such, it is incorporated
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment64 and applies to the
states as well as the federal government.65
The constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy stems from the
common-law pleas of autrefois acquit (a former acquittal), autrefois convict (a
former conviction), and pardon,66 and the provision encompasses several
protections. Like the common-law plea of autrefois acquit,67 the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars the government from prosecuting a person a second time

60. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
62. Id. at 187–88.
63. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (internal quotation marks omitted);
accord id. at 794 (“[T]he double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment represents a
fundamental ideal in our constitutional heritage . . . .”).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o . . . State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” Id.
65. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794, 796.
66. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127–28 (1980); United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 87 (1978).
67. See supra notes 12, 17.
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for the same offense68 after acquittal.69 Like the common-law plea of autrefois
convict,70 the Clause prohibits the government from prosecuting an individual
a second time for the same offense after already being convicted.71 In addition,
the Clause bars the government from imposing multiple punishments upon a
person for the same offense in separate proceedings.72 In some circumstances,
it prohibits the government from prosecuting a person a second time for the
same offense after a judge prematurely terminates the individual’s first trial,
either by declaring a mistrial73 or by dismissing the charges against him or her
before the fact-finder reaches a verdict in the case.74

68. See DAVID S. RUDSTEIN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 73–92 (2004) (discussing what constitutes
the “same offence” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause).
69. See, e.g., Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467, 473 (2005); Smalis v.
Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145–46 (1986); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Scott, 437 U.S. at 88;
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 73–75 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
10–11 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 576 (1977); Price v.
Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Benton, 395 U.S. at 796-97; Fong Foo v. United States, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190–91 (1957); United
States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
70. See supra note 17.
71. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697–98 (1993); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682, 682 (1977) (per curiam); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 168 (1977); In re Nielsen, 131
U.S. 176, 189–90 (1889); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (precluding the
criminal prosecution of a juvenile for armed robbery after his previous delinquency based upon
the same armed robbery).
The government can retry an individual who succeeded in having his conviction set
aside on appeal or collateral attack on the basis of trial error. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Nelson, 488
U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 402 (1987) (per curiam); United States v.
Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1971); Ball, 163 U.S. at 672; see also RUDSTEIN, supra note 68, at
95–110 (outlining exceptions to double jeopardy).
72. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–100 (1997).
73. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486–87 (1971) (plurality opinion) (noting that the
trial judge sua sponte declared a mistrial to allow several government witnesses the opportunity to
consult with attorneys about their privilege against self-incrimination); Downum v. United States,
372 U.S. 734, 737–38 (1963) (upholding the declaration of a mistrial, at the prosecutor’s request
and over the defendant’s objection, because of the absence of a key government witness); see also
RUDSTEIN, supra note 68, at 43–73 (discussing the nature of “jeopardy” generally).
74. United States v. Gaytan, 115 F.3d 737, 740, 744 (9th Cir. 1997) (barring retrial where
the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against the defendant because of discovery
violations by the prosecution); United States v. Govro, 833 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1987) (barring
retrial because the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against the defendant based on
matters independent of factual guilt); State v. Bell, 753 So. 2d 619, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(precluding retrial where the trial judge sua sponte dismissed the charge against the defendant
because of the lack of credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses); see also Scott, 437 U.S. at
98–99 (concluding that defendants who seek a ruling on the offense based on procedure rather
than factual guilt suffer no harm when the prosecution successfully appeals and retries them, but
implying that the government could not always retry them if the dismissal was either sua sponte
or was the result of a prosecution motion).
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A. Reprosecution Following an Acquittal
On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that the Double
Jeopardy Clause accords “absolute finality”75 to an acquittal.76 Finality
prevents the government from trying an individual a second time for the same
offense following his or her acquittal,77 whether the acquittal was rendered by
a jury,78 a judge in a bench trial,79 or a judge in a jury trial.80 Moreover, the
finality of an acquittal applies even if “based upon an egregiously erroneous
foundation.”81

75. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); accord Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147,
152 n.2 (1986); Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306 (1984); Bullington v.
Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
76. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause
. . . prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits
reexamination of an acquittal by a jury . . . . [F]urther proceedings to secure [a conviction] are
impermissible.”); Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978) (“That ‘[a] verdict of
acquittal . . . [may] not be reviewed . . . without putting [the defendant] twice in jeopardy, and
thereby violating the Constitution’ has recently been described as ‘the most fundamental rule in
the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.’” (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977))); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 (1975) (“[A] verdict
of acquittal at the hands of the jury [is] not subject to review by motion for rehearing [or] appeal
. . . .”); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (“The verdict of
acquittal was final, and could not be reviewed . . . without putting [the petitioners] twice in
jeopardy and thereby violating the constitution.” (quoting Ball, 163 U.S. at 671 (alteration in
Fong Foo))).
77. Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145–46 (1986);
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129; Scott, 437 U.S. at 88; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 64; Burks, 437 U.S. at
10–11; Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 575–76; Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 797 (1969); Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143; Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 188, 192 (1957); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671.
78. Price, 398 U.S. at 329 (implying acquittal of the charged greater offense by conviction
for the lesser offense); Benton, 395 U.S. at 797; Green, 355 U.S. at 198 (implying acquittal of
charged greater offense by conviction for lesser offense); Ball, 163 U.S. at 671.
79. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 573 n.12 (dictum) (“In the situation where a criminal
prosecution is tried to a judge alone, there is no question that the Double Jeopardy Clause accords
his determination in favor of a defendant full constitutional effect.”).
80. Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 64; Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571; Fong
Foo, 369 U.S. at 142, 143.
81. Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143 (indicating that, although the trial judge improperly acquitted
the defendants, re-examination of the acquittal would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause);
accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 129 (quoting Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 143); Sanabria, 437 U.S. at
78; see also Smith, 543 U.S. at 473 (“[T]he well established rule [is] that the bar [of the Double
Jeopardy Clause] will attach to a pre-verdict acquittal that is patently wrong in law.”); Smalis, 476
U.S. at 144 n.7 (finding that only the accuracy of an acquittal is affected by an erroneous
evidentiary ruling, not its character); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132 (“It is acquittal that prevents
retrial even if legal error was committed at the trial.”); Burks, 437 U.S. at 16 stating that finality
is granted no matter how egregious the decision); Green, 355 U.S. at 224 (determining that the
state cannot appeal even if the acquittal may have been erroneous).
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In a bench trial, or when the judge intervenes in a jury trial, what constitutes
an “acquittal” for purposes of double jeopardy “is not . . . controlled by the
form of the judge’s action;”82 rather, a trial judge’s ruling constitutes an
“acquittal” only when it constitutes a resolution, in favor of the defendant, of
all the factual elements of the offense charged.83 Under this definition, “a
ruling [by the trial judge] that as a matter of law the [prosecution’s] evidence is
insufficient to establish [the defendant’s] factual guilt . . . is an acquittal under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.”84
The Supreme Court has identified a number of related individual and
societal interests served by the double jeopardy rule. One purpose served in
the interest of both the individual and society is that the Double Jeopardy
Clause preserves the finality of judgments85 while protecting the “integrity” of
those judgments.86 Additionally, the guarantee serves to minimize the
financial, psychological, and physical ordeal of the trial process,87 and reduces
the risk of erroneously convicting an innocent person88 by preventing the
government from attempting to persuade a second fact-finder of the
individual’s guilt “after having failed with the first.”89 The rule against double

82. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571; accord Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (stating that a judge’s
characterization of his own ruling does not control its essence).
83. Scott, 437 U.S. at 97 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571).
84. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 144; see also Smith, 543 U.S. at 467–68 (holding that a state rule
requiring the trial judge to enter a finding of not guilty where the evidence is insufficient as a
matter of law meets the definition of an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes); Martin Linen,
430 U.S. at 571–72 (“There can be no question that the judgments of acquittal entered here by the
District Court were ‘acquittals’ in substance as well as form.”).
85. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978) (likening the interest to that served by res judicata
and collateral estoppel); accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128 (“[I]t has been said that ‘a’ or ‘the’
‘primary purpose’ of the [Double Jeopardy] Clause was ‘to preserve the finality of
judgments’ . . . .” (quoting Crist, 437 U.S. at 33)); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
503 (1978) (stating that the public has strong interests in obtaining finality in criminal
judgments); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (“Where successive prosecutions are at
stake, the guarantee [against double jeopardy] serves ‘a constitutional policy of finality for the
defendant’s benefit.’” (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality
opinion))); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (“Granting the Government
. . . broad appeal rights would . . . disserve the defendant’s legitimate interest in the finality of a
verdict of acquittal.”).
86. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92.
87. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (noting that the state often has more
resources than a defendant); see also infra notes 203–18 and accompanying text.
88. Green, 355 U.S. at 188; accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 128, 130 (quoting Green, 355
U.S. at 187–88); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 215–16 (1978) (quoting Washington, 434 U.S.
at 504).
89. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352; see also infra notes 246–58 and accompanying text.
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jeopardy also protects the power of the jury to nullify the law by acquitting the
defendant “against the evidence.”90
The protection against double jeopardy serves other purposes in addition to
those expressly identified by the Supreme Court. Not only does it help to
prevent police and prosecutors from using the criminal process to harass an
individual who was already tried and acquitted for an offense,91 but it also
helps to conserve prosecutorial and judicial resources92 and assists in
maintaining the public’s respect for, and confidence in, the criminal justice
system.93 By generally providing the government with “but one chance to
convict a defendant[, precluding double jeopardy] operates as a powerful
incentive to efficient and exhaustive investigation”94 and prosecution95 from
the outset.96
B. Prosecutorial Appeals
The Supreme Court has remarked that “the primary purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause [is] to prevent successive trials, and not [g]overnment appeals
per se.”97 Accordingly, a prosecutor’s appeal does not invoke the Double
Jeopardy Clause so long as it does not present a threat of successive

90. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 130 n.11 (quoting Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double
Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001,
1063 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.1(g) (3d ed. 2008); Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Towards a
General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 129–30; infra notes 285–90 and
accompanying text.
91. MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 3–4 (1969); AUSTRALIAN MODEL
CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 21, at 2; ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267,
supra note 11, para. 4.14; see also infra text notes 295–300 and accompanying text.
92. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4; see also infra notes 309–17 and accompanying text.
93. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4; Connelly v. DPP, [1964] A.C. 1254, 1346 (H.L.), 1353
(Lord Devlin) (appeal taken from Eng.) (noting that predictability in rulings builds confidence);
see also infra notes 318–27 and accompanying text.
94. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11; see
also FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (arguing that efforts on behalf of the police and prosecutors
should be aimed at the first trial); ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.3.
95. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4; Ian Dennis, Rethinking Double Jeopardy: Justice and
Finality in Criminal Process, 2000 CRIM. L.R. 933, 941.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 328–42.
97. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 (1978); see also United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980) (declaring that the Double Jeopardy Clause is not an
absolute bar to prosecutorial appeals); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
568–69 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause aims to prevent multiple prosecutions
and not to prevent appeals by the government); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975)
(“In the course of the debates over the Bill of Rights, there was no suggestion that the Double
Jeopardy Clause imposed any general ban on appeals by the prosecution.”).
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prosecutions.98
For example, double jeopardy does not preclude the
prosecution from appealing an acquittal ordered by a trial judge or appellate
court overruling a jury’s verdict of guilty, because a new trial would be
unnecessary.99 The appellate court, instead, could merely reverse the trial
judge’s decision, thereby reinstating the jury’s original verdict of guilty.100 For
the same reason, the prosecution can appeal an acquittal when the judge, in a
bench trial, sets aside a finding of guilty and instead enters an acquittal after
concluding that there was reliance on inadmissible evidence without which the
prosecution would have failed to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.101 Similarly, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the
prosecution from appealing the sentence imposed on a convicted defendant, in
part, because a revision of the defendant’s sentence does not require him or her
to undergo a second trial.102
However, when reversal of an acquittal by the appellate court would lead to
either a second trial103 or “further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged,”104
such as a resumption of the appellee’s trial,105 the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits an appeal by the prosecution.106 In Smalis v. Pennsylvania,107 a
98. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 568–70; accord DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 132. For the
prosecution to appeal, local law must authorize that appeal. See United States v. Sanges, 144
U.S. 310, 312 (1892) (“[I]t is settled by an overwhelming weight of American authority, that the
state has no right to sue out a writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal
case, except under accordance with express statutes . . . .”); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
90, § 27.3(b) (noting that specific statutory authorization is required for appeals); Wilson, 420
U.S. at 336–42 (providing a brief overview of how Congress and the Supreme Court have dealt
with prosecutorial appeals in federal courts).
99. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 467 (2005).
100. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365 (1975), overruled on other grounds by
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978); accord Smith, 543 U.S. at 467; DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
at 130; Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352–53.
101. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1978).
102. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136–38, 143 (noting that such an appeal does not question the
defendant’s guilt).
103. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145–46 (1986) (finding such an appeal to have no
purpose); Scott, 437 U.S. at 91; Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 570-71 (precluding an appeal where
subsequent proceedings are sought to resolve factual disputes related to the offense); Wilson, 420
U.S. at 336.
104. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 146 (quoting Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 570–71 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
105. Id. at 145 (rejecting the prosecution’s contention that its appeal was permissible because
resuming the defendant’s trial would only put him in “continuing jeopardy”); see also Smith, 543
U.S. at 467 (concluding that further fact-finding proceedings related to guilt were impermissible).
106. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 469 n.4 (affirming that a final acquittal is not reviewable);
Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69 (establishing that even erroneous acquittals by the trial court are not
reviewable); Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 575 (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeal from [a
judgment of] acquittal entered [by a trial court upon a motion by the defendant or upon the court’s
own motion].”); Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345 (“[A] verdict of acquittal at the hands of the jury [is] not
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husband and wife, charged with various offenses stemming from a suspicious
fire in a building that they owned, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
offered in their bench trial by filing a demurrer at the close of the prosecution’s
case.108 The trial court sustained the demurrer on three of the charges, stating
that, after considering all the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, the
court was not presented with enough evidence to conclude guilt beyond a
The prosecution appealed110 and, although the
reasonable doubt.109
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the appeal could proceed,111 the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
prosecution’s appeal.112 The Court found that the trial judge’s ruling that the
prosecution’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to prove factual guilt
was equivalent to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.113 It further
explicated that a reversal of the ruling would require further “factfinding
proceedings going to guilt or innocence”114 that would place the defendants in
jeopardy a second time for the same offense.115
To reach its holding in Smalis, the Supreme Court rejected the prosecution’s
argument that resumption of the bench trial following a successful appeal
would “simply constitute ‘continuing jeopardy,’”116 reasoning that the trial
judge’s acquittal terminated the initial jeopardy.117
This “continuing jeopardy” argument relied upon by the prosecution in
Smalis was espoused by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his Kepner v.
United States dissent.118 In Kepner, Justice Holmes observed:

subject to review by . . . appeal . . . .”); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (stating
that a constitutional violation would occur where a final verdict was reviewed); Fong Foo, 369
U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (addressing Ball and reversing the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that vacated the acquittal and ordered a new trial).
107. 476 U.S. at 141–42.
108. Id. at 141.
109. Id. at 141–42 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a-102a). The charges were for murder,
voluntary manslaughter, and causing a catastrophe. Id. at 141.
110. Id. at 142.
111. Commonwealth v. Zoller, 490 A.2d 394, 401 (Pa. 1985) (characterizing demurrers and
acquittals differently, therefore permitting the prosecution to appeal from an order sustaining a
defendant’s demurrer).
112. Smalis, 476 U.S. at 146.
113. Id. at 144 (stating that the defendant sought a ruling that would establish his factual
guilt).
114. Id. at 145.
115. Id. at 145–46 (observing that such a result is against the defendant’s interest in obtaining
finality).
116. Id. at 145.
117. Id. (noting the difference between acquittals, which terminate the initial jeopardy, and
convictions, which do not).
118. 195 U.S. 100, 134–37 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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[I]t seems to me that logically and rationally a man cannot be said to
be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he
may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy, from its
beginning to the end of the cause. Everybody agrees that the [double
jeopardy] principle in its origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a new
and independent case where a man already had been tried once. But
there is no rule that a man may not be tried twice in the same case. It
has been decided by this court that he may be tried a second time,
even for his life, if the jury disagree, or, notwithstanding their
agreement and verdict, if the verdict is set aside on the prisoner’s
exceptions for error in the trial . . . .
If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the
government, I believe it would be impossible to maintain that the
prisoner would be protected by the Constitution from being tried
again. He no more would be put in jeopardy a second time when
retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would be
when retried for a mistake that did him harm . . . .119
This argument, however, has not been accepted by the Court.120
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has recognized that a legal system
that reviewed all alleged legal errors would prevent releasing defendants who
benefitted from such error, the Court rejected that position, concluding “that
the policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting
the [g]overnment to appeal after a verdict of acquittal.”121 In United States v.
Wilson, the Court explained that a broad grant of appeal rights is in conflict
with providing the defendant finality.122 Perhaps more importantly, allowing
an appeal provides a second opportunity to the prosecutor to convince a
fact-finder of the defendant’s guilt and permits that same prosecutor to
strengthen the weaknesses in his or her original presentation.123 Also, a state,
with its superior resources, can wear down the defendant, “thereby ‘enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’”124

119. Id. at 134–35 (citations omitted).
120. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 90 n.6 (1978); see also Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 192 (1957) (noting that Holmes’s “continuing jeopardy” argument has been
consistently rejected).
121. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975) (stating that such a broad grant of
appeals to the government would result in a diminution of the interests that the public and
individuals have in obtaining a final judgment).
122. Id.; see also Smalis, 476 U.S. at 145 (explaining that successful post-acquittal appeals in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause serve no proper purpose and frustrate the defendant’s
interest in obtaining a final judgment).
123. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352.
124. Scott, 437 U.S. at 91 (citing Green, 355 U.S. at188).
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III. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003 IN THE UNITED STATES: WOULD
ENACTMENT OF A STATUTE OR COURT RULE ALLOWING FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE?
In all of the cases just discussed, it was evident that the trial judge’s acquittal
was a final judgment and that the prosecution was barred from bringing an
appeal because of the Double Jeopardy Clause. But, what if a state or the
federal government enacted a statute or adopted a court rule based upon
England’s Criminal Justice Act 2003, providing that a trial judge’s pre-verdict
decision to order an acquittal does not become “final” until the expiration of a
specified period of time during which the prosecution could decide to appeal
that decision? Further, what if the statute or court rule provided that, if the
prosecution avails itself of the opportunity to appeal, the trial judge’s decision
would have no effect until either the appellate court denied leave to appeal, the
prosecution abandoned the appeal before it was decided, or the appellate court
decided the appeal adversely to the prosecution? Under such a provision, the
trial judge’s determination that the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie
case of guilt would not immediately become a final judgment and, therefore,
arguably would not constitute an “acquittal” for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Would the Double Jeopardy Clause still bar further
proceedings in the matter going to guilt or innocence if the prosecution
appealed the trial judge’s decision and the appellate court overturned that
decision?
A. A Trial Judge’s Reconsideration of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling: Smith v.
Massachusetts
The Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Massachusetts can support the
argument that a jurisdiction in the United States could, consistent with the
Double Jeopardy Clause, provide the prosecution with the right to appeal a
directed verdict of not guilty.125 Smith involved a trial judge’s reconsideration
of her initial midtrial acquittal ruling on a charge against the accused.126 Smith
and his codefendant elected to have a jury trial and, at the close of the
prosecution’s case-in-chief, Smith moved “for a required finding of not guilty”
on a firearm-possession charge127 pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Criminal
Procedure 25(a).128 Smith asserted that the prosecution had not proved that the

125. 542 U.S. 462, 474 (2005).
126. Id. at 464.
127. Id. at 465 (citing MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a)).
128. Rule 25(a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The judge on motion of a defendant or on his own motion shall enter a finding of not
guilty of the offense charged in an indictment or complaint or any part thereof after the
evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a conviction on the charge. If a defendant’s motion for a required finding of not
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barrel of the gun in question was less than sixteen inches, a required element of
the charge.129 Although the victim testified that Smith had shot him with a .32
or .38 revolver, Smith’s motion was granted because the trial judge found no
evidence that the barrel of the gun was less than sixteen inches.130 Towards the
conclusion of the trial, the trial judge, who had not notified the jury of Smith’s
acquittal on the firearm-possession charge, reversed her ruling and allowed the
jury to consider that charge.131 The jury convicted Smith of all three offenses
and the state appellate court affirmed.132
Following a grant of certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the firearmpossession conviction.133 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precluded the trial judge from reconsidering the midtrial acquittal and
submitting the charge to the jury.134 This was founded on the determination
that the judge’s ruling constituted an “acquittal,”135 which could not be
reconsidered on appeal once final.136 The Court reasoned that Smith was
subjected to further proceedings determining his guilt—prohibited by Smalis v.
Pennsylvania.137
In reaching its result, the Court first concluded that an acquittal was reached
when the not guilty finding was entered and the trial judge concluded that the
evidence presented could not sustain a conviction as a matter of law.138 The
Court next considered whether the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the trial

guilty is made at the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, it shall be ruled upon at
that time . . . .
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
129. Smith, 543 U.S. at 464–65.
130. Id. at 465.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 466. With respect to the firearm-possession charge, the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts held that the trial judge’s reconsideration of her midtrial ruling did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause because it did not subject Smith to a second trial or proceeding. Id. The
appellate court also found that Rule 25(a), which mandates that a motion for a required finding of
not guilty be made at the close of the prosecution’s case “be ruled upon at that time,” did not
preclude the trial judge from correcting her initial ruling. Commonwealth v. Smith, 788 N.E.2d
977, 982–83 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); see also supra note 128. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts denied further review. Commonwealth v. Smith, 797 N.E.2d 380 (Mass. 2003).
133. Smith, 543 U.S. at 475.
134. Id. at 473.
135. Id. at 467–68 (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571
(1977)); see also id. at 469 (restating that the Court “concluded that the judge acquitted” Smith).
136. Id. at 469 n.4. “[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an
acquittal by jury verdict. This is so whether the judge’s ruling of acquittal comes in a bench trial
or, as here, in a trial by jury.” Id. at 467 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 467 (quoting Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)).
138. Id. at 467–68 (finding the ruling to be an acquittal because it was a resolution that went
to the defendant’s guilt).
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judge from reconsidering her ruling.139 The Court began its analysis by noting
that Smith had no reason to doubt the acquittal’s finality because: (1) the
prosecution did not move for reconsideration of the ruling or reserve such a
motion;140 (2) it did not request a continuance to provide favorable authority to
the court;141 and (3) the trial judge’s ruling did not “appear on its face to be
tentative.”142
The Court then observed that, at the time of Smith’s trial, Massachusetts did
not provide, either by statute, rule of court,143 or case law144 that a trial judge’s
midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence was not
final and that the judge could later reconsider his or her decision.145 Although
the Supreme Court acknowledged that appellate courts might be able to
announce a state rule finding midtrial acquittals tentative where
reconsideration does not create any prejudice, it held that an appellate court
could not do so in a case such as Smith, where prejudice was created because
the defense had presented its case.146 The Court remarked that allowing a
court to reconsider its initial ruling at that point would allow the Double
Jeopardy Clause’s guarantee “to become a potential snare for those who
reasonably rely upon it.”147
139. Id. at 469.
140. Id. at 470.
141. Id. The Supreme Court observed that the prosecutor ultimately obtained the
reconsideration during a fifteen-minute recess before closing and that, had a continuance been
requested when the motion was made, it would have been resolved before the defendant went
forward. Id. at 474–75.
142. Id. at 470. The Supreme Court pointed out that Massachusetts’s procedure did not
permit deferment on Smith’s motion or require the defendants to present their cases while the
prosecution reserved the right to present more evidence. Id. The Court also observed that the
prosecution’s request to reopen the case was denied because it was time to rule on Smith’s
motion. Id.
143. Id. at 471 (characterizing the rule as one of “nonfinality”).
144. Id. The prosecution argued that interlocutory rulings could be reviewed, but the
Supreme Court rejected the argument, stating that the cases relied upon did not extend to
determinations that would end the case. Id.
145. Id. at 470 (remarking that there was no instance of any state having done so by statute or
rule of court). The Court went on to cite instances where states had found—through case law or
by exercising their supervisory authority—that an acquittal does not become effective
immediately upon its announcement by the trial judge. Id. at 470–71.
146. Id. at 471–72. The Supreme Court identified two sources of potential prejudice. First, a
defendant may be induced to defend undismissed charges when he should be silent. Id. at 472. In
jurisdictions reviewing sufficiency of the evidence challenges on the entire record, a defendant
who presents evidence for undismissed charges may bolster the prosecution’s case so much as to
support a guilty verdict on the initially dismissed count. Id.
Second, “[i]n all jurisdictions, . . . false assurance of acquittal on one count may induce the
defendant to present defenses to the remaining counts that are inadvisable—for example, a
defense that entails admission of guilt on the acquitted count.” Id.
147. Id. at 473.
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Two statements in Smith are highly relevant in determining whether a
jurisdiction could constitutionally allow the prosecution to appeal a pre-verdict
court-ordered acquittal. First, the Court stated that “as a general matter state
law may prescribe that a judge’s midtrial determination of the sufficiency of
the [prosecution’s] proof can be reconsidered.”148 Second, it said that a
midtrial acquittal need not be treated as final for double jeopardy purposes
when “the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by
pre-existing rule or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on
the sufficiency of the evidence.”149 All four dissenters in Smith agreed with
these statements by the majority and, therefore, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out
in her dissenting opinion, the Court unanimously concluded that double
jeopardy does not preclude trial judges from reviewing midtrial acquittals on
less than all counts of an indictment.150 Accordingly, a jurisdiction can
provide such reconsideration authority to trial judges by statute, court rule,
case law, or judicial oversight.151
B. Double Jeopardy and Appeal of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling:
Extending Smith
The Smith Court was concerned only with whether the Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits a trial judge from reconsidering his or her initial ruling, made
at the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, allowing the defendant’s motion
for a court-ordered acquittal.152 Nevertheless, the Smith Court’s statements
and reasoning arguably can be extended to support the constitutional validity
of a statute or court rule modeled after the Criminal Justice Act 2003.153

148. Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 475 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. Id.; see also, e.g., People v. Madison, 176 P.3d 793, 800 (Colo. App. 2007) (holding that
the trial court did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when it reconsidered its ruling that the
prosecution had not presented sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt on one of several
charges, because a previous state supreme court decision held that a trial court could reverse a
court-ordered acquittal before the jury is dismissed provided there is no opportunity for prejudice
to the defense).
The lone exception to the general rule stated in the text is that an appellate court cannot announce
a new rule and apply it retroactively to the case before it when the trial judge’s acquittal
reconsideration occurred after the defendant began presentation of his case. See supra notes
147–48 and accompanying text; cf. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 635 (2003) (holding that a
habeas corpus petitioner was not entitled to relief because the state supreme court’s decision that
the trial judge, in reconsidering his initial midtrial acquittal ruling before the defendant began
presenting his case and submitting the charge to the jury, did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law).
152. Smith, 543 U.S. at 469.
153. See supra notes 29–59 and accompanying text.
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The Smith Court unanimously agreed that if the state had previously
provided by statute or otherwise that a midtrial acquittal ruling could be
reconsidered by the trial judge, it would not have been final for double
jeopardy purposes.154 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 accomplishes the same
result with respect to an appeal by the prosecution of a ruling of no case to
answer. The Act effectively provides that a trial judge’s ruling of no case to
answer, the functional equivalent of a directed verdict of not guilty or required
finding of not guilty, is not immediately final.155 A trial judge’s ruling that the
evidence in the prosecution’s case-in-chief fails to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt effectively becomes final only when one of the
following events occurs: (1) the period during which the prosecution can
inform the trial court that it intends to appeal the ruling expires without the
prosecution informing the trial court of such an intention;156 (2) the Court of
Appeal denies leave to appeal after the prosecution timely informed the trial
court that it intended to appeal;157 (3) the prosecution abandons its appeal
before the Court of Appeal determines the appeal;158 or (4) the Court of Appeal
affirms the trial judge’s ruling.159
Under a statute or court rule based on the Act, a trial judge’s midtrial
acquittal ruling would not be a “final judgment” of acquittal and, at least on its
face, would not run afoul of the double jeopardy rule that a final acquittal may
not be reviewed.160 Such a statute or court rule would also be consistent with
154. Smith, 543 U.S. at 470, 473.
155. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(3) (Eng.).
156. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text. This would occur almost at once if the
prosecutor does not immediately inform the trial court either that it intends to appeal the ruling or
that it desires an adjournment to consider whether to appeal. See supra notes 34–39 and
accompanying text. If the prosecution obtained an adjournment to decide whether to appeal, it
generally would occur on the next business day following the adjournment. See supra note 38.
157. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4), (8), (9)(a). The ruling would also become final if
the trial court denied leave to appeal and the prosecution decided not to seek leave to appeal from
the Court of Appeal. See id. § 58(9)(a).
158. Id. § 58(8), (9)(b).
159. Id. § 61(1), (3), (7). In theory, a ruling of no case to answer might not be final even
after the Court of Appeal confirms the trial judge’s ruling because the Act provides that the
prosecution can appeal to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom following an adverse
decision by the Court of Appeal. Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, c. 19, § 33(1)–(2) (Eng.). In fact,
neither the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, nor its predecessor, the House of Lords, has
decided such an appeal. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, Preamble, § 23, sch. 9, ¶ 16
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/4/pdfs/ukpga_20050004_en.pdf
(indicating the transition from the House of Lords to the Supreme Court as the body to decide
appeals).
160. Smith, 543 U.S. at 469 n.4; see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2012)
(concluding that a foreperson’s report to the trial judge concerning jury deliberations was not
final because deliberations continued after the report and therefore did not constitute an acquittal);
id. at 2051 (stating that the foreperson’s report was not a final decision); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (“‘If the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by
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the unanimous view in Smith that a state can make merely provisional what
would otherwise be a “final” acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.161 In
other words, a trial judge’s midtrial ruling that the prosecution’s evidence
failed to establish a prima facie case arguably would not meet the Supreme
Court’s definition of an “acquittal” for double jeopardy purposes because it
was not a final resolution in favor of the defendant that went to the defendant’s
guilt.162 In addition, a pre-existing statute or court rule would provide notice to
the accused that such a ruling was not final.163
Are there any differences between allowing a trial judge to reconsider his or
her midtrial acquittal ruling and allowing an appellate court to review such a
ruling—differences that would preclude extending the Supreme Court’s
holding in Smith?
In her Smith dissent, Justice Ginsburg expressly
distinguished the two situations.164 Justice Ginsburg believed that a trial
judge’s reconsideration of a midtrial acquittal ruling would not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause (at least in the absence of any prejudice to the
accused’s defense)165 because further proceedings in the case would merely be
“continuing proceedings before the initial tribunal prior to the rendition of a
final adjudication.”166 Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg also thought that
acquittal reconsiderations by an appellate court would be precluded “because
reversal would lead to a remand for further trial proceedings.”167 She argued
a final judgment [of acquittal], the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would
be unfair.’” (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 424 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (emphasis added)));
Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 214 (1978) (quoting Washington, 424 U.S. at 503).
161. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
162. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (quoting United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (emphasis added and brackets deleted)); accord Smith, 543
U.S. at 468 (citing Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 571).
163. Cf. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136 (explaining that a defendant should not expect finality
until appellate review of a ruling when a statute authorizes prosecutorial appeals because such a
statute puts the defendant on notice); id. at 139 (“[W]here . . . Congress has specifically provided
that the sentence [of a convicted defendant] is subject to appeal[,] . . . there can be no expectation
of finality in the original sentence.”).
In Smith, the Court expressed concern where the accused is not put on notice that a trial judge’s
initial ruling was not final. See Smith, 543 U.S. at 471–72 (concluding that, in a case in which the
trial judge reconsidered her initial midtrial acquittal ruling after the trial had proceeded to the
presentation of the defendant’s case on the undismissed charges, an appellate court cannot
announce a new rule that midtrial acquittals are tentative, because of the possibility of prejudice
to the accused, who was “justifiabl[y] ignoran[t],” i.e., lacked notice, of the rule). Under the
Criminal Justice Act 2003, a person being tried for a criminal offense knows at the outset of his or
her trial that if the trial judge should rule that there is no case to answer and the prosecution
informs the judge of its intent to appeal, then the ruling will not immediately take effect.
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(3)–(4).
164. Smith, 543 U.S. at 477–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 476 (observing no prejudice was present in the case).
166. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 477 (arguing that Smalis should control this case).
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that an appealed ruling seemingly has finality after moving to the appellate
forum.168 The majority of the Court disagreed with Justice Ginsburg’s position
on the grounds that “the acquittal was reconsidered ‘before the court of first
instance ha[d] disassociated itself from the case or any issue in it.’”169
However, the majority did seem to agree with Justice Ginsburg that finality is
reached when the appealed ruling moves into the appellate forum.170
The Justices are correct when they imply that a trial judge’s order must be
final to be appealable; finality is a required element for review in the United
States.171 An order, however, need not be a “final judgment,” i.e., one that
concludes the trial court’s criminal proceedings,172 to be “final” for purposes of
appeal. Rather, a “final decision,”—one that “constitute[s] a complete, formal,
and, in the trial court, final [determination] of a [party’s]
. . . claim,”173—may sometimes be appealable. For example, in Abney v.
United States, the Court held that a defendant in a federal criminal prosecution
could immediately appeal a trial judge’s pretrial ruling denying a motion to
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, despite the ruling not
being a “final judgment.”174 By expressly stating that the taking of an appeal
signals the finality of the order being appealed, the majority in Smith seemed
to distinguish between a final order, or decision, and a final judgment.
Accordingly, because a final decision is not always a final judgment,175 a
statute or court rule arguably could, within the framework of current principles
governing appeals, provide that: (1) a trial judge’s midtrial determination that
the prosecution’s evidence fails to establish a prima facie case of guilt does not
become effective immediately and is therefore not a “final judgment”
constrained by double jeopardy principles;176 (2) as a “final decision,” the trial
judge’s ruling may be appealed by the prosecution; and (3) if the appellate
court overturns the trial judge’s ruling, the defendant’s trial can be resumed or
the defendant can be tried a second time for the same offense. This is precisely
168. Id.
169. Id. at 469 n.4 (majority opinion) (stating that the absence of an appeal does not
necessarily connote nonfinality (quoting id. at 477–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
170. Id.
171. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 610 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324 (1940)); see also 4 AM. JUR. 2D
Appellate Review §§ 79, 202 (2007).
172. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
173. Id. at 659 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 657, 662.
175. Id. at 658 (discussing factors to be considered in characterizing a rule as a final decision
(quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 12 (1951))).
176. See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469 n.4 (2005) (“An acquittal, once final,
may not be reconsidered on appeal.” (emphasis added)); see also supra note 160 (citing decisions
in which the Supreme Court stated that a second trial is barred when an accused’s innocence has
been determined by a final judgment).
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what Parliament did in England with the Criminal Justice Act 2003.177 Many
other countries similarly recognize the protection against double jeopardy, yet
permit the prosecution to appeal an acquittal.178
In effect, a statute or court rule based on the Act would create a two-tiered
process for the midtrial determination of the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence. If the trial judge finds that the prosecution did not establish a prima
facie case of guilt, that decision is not immediately final and may be appealed
by the prosecution.179 If the prosecution avails itself of the opportunity to
appeal, the appellate court will ultimately decide the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence.180 Such a procedure arguably would be constitutional
under Swisher v. Brady.181 In that case, the Court found no double jeopardy
violation in a juvenile court procedure under which the state, in a delinquency
proceeding, could obtain a trial de novo by a juvenile court judge if it filed
exceptions to a master’s proposed findings and recommendations that favored
the juvenile.182 In reaching this result, the Court noted that states have the
authority to choose and authorize the fact-finder and adjudicator.183
Subsequently, in Smith v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court explained that
Swisher stood for the notion that a defendant’s jeopardy continues until a final
decision is made.184 Arguably, a statute or court rule based upon the Act
would do no more than designate the appellate court as “the factfinder and
adjudicator”185 of a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty in those cases in
which the trial judge decided the motion in favor of the accused and the state
appealed. In such cases, a trial judge’s decision to allow the defendant’s
motion would not be final unless the state decided to accept the trial judge’s
decision without appeal.186
As the above analysis indicates, a statute or court rule authorizing the
prosecution to appeal a midtrial decision by a trial judge to direct a verdict of
177. See supra notes 15–19, 156–60 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 21–26 and accompanying text.
179. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(1)–(2) (Eng.).
180. See id. § 61(1). If the trial judge found the prosecution’s case sufficient to establish the
defendant’s guilt, that decision would stand for purposes of the trial; however, as under current
practice, the defendant could challenge the trial court’s ruling on appeal if he or she is ultimately
convicted by the jury. See, e.g., Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 3 (1978).
181. 438 U.S. 204, 215–16 (1978) (finding that Maryland’s Rule 911 did not impinge on the
Double Jeopardy Clause).
182. Id. at 206, 210–11, 215.
183. Id. at 216 (stating that Maryland had conferred this role on the Juvenile Court judge and
that he was, therefore, empowered to accept, modify, or reject proposals).
184. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 469 n.4 (2005) (citing Swisher, 438 U.S. at 216).
185. Swisher, 438 U.S. at 216.
186. Even if the state appealed, the trial judge’s decision might become final if the state
failed to obtain leave to appeal or abandoned its appeal before the appellate court decided it. See
supra notes 156–59 and accompanying text.
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not guilty may be consistent with the Supreme Court’s cases interpreting the
Double Jeopardy Clause.187 Nevertheless, the final decision about the
constitutionality of such a statute or court rule must depend on how it comports
with the policies underlying the guarantee against double jeopardy.
C. Appeal of a Midtrial Acquittal Ruling and the Policies Underlying the
Guarantee Against Double Jeopardy
1. Preserving the Finality of Judgments
A statute or court rule based upon the Criminal Justice Act 2003 would not
contravene the policy of maintaining the finality of judgments, at least insofar
as finality protects personal interests.188 Such a statute or court rule would
provide that a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal has no effect during the period in
which the prosecution can decide whether to appeal the ruling.189 If the
prosecution does appeal, the judge’s ruling would also have no effect during
the pendency of that appeal.190 Moreover, the statute or court rule would
provide that the trial judge cannot “take any steps in consequence of the
ruling”191 and, if the judge does take any steps, those steps would have no
effect.192
As a result of these provisions, a trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of
not guilty would not become “final,” and the trial judge could not enter a valid
final judgment of acquittal in the case until: (1) the prosecution fails to notify
the trial judge of its intention to appeal during the period in which it is
permitted to do so;193 (2) the prosecution informs the judge in a timely manner
that it intends to appeal the ruling, but leave to appeal is not obtained;194 or (3)
if leave is obtained, either the prosecution abandons the appeal,195 or the
appellate court upholds the trial judge’s ruling that the prosecution failed to
187. See supra notes 179–86 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 189–207 and accompanying text (focusing on personal interests served
by preserving the finality of an acquittal judgment); see also infra notes 309–27 (outlining public
interests served by preserving the finality of an acquittal judgment).
189. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 58(3)–(4) (Eng.).
190. See id. § 58(10).
191. See id. § 58(11)(b).
192. See id. § 58(11)(c).
193. See id. § 58(3)–(4).
194. See id. § 57(4) (requiring the prosecution to obtain leave to appeal, either from the trial
judge or from the Court of Appeal). A ruling of no case to answer, therefore, would become
“final” if the prosecution failed to obtain leave to appeal because, pursuant to the required
“acquittal agreement” terms undertaken by the prosecution as a condition of taking the appeal,
“the defendant . . . [must] be acquitted of [the] offense [in question] if [leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeal is not obtained].” Id. § 58(8)–(9)(a); see also supra notes 40–41 and
accompanying text.
195. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)–(9)(b).
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establish a prima facie case of guilt.196 Consequently, until one of these events
occurs, there is no judgment for which “finality” must be preserved or
“integrity” protected. Moreover, every criminal defendant would know at the
outset of his or her trial that, should the trial judge find the prosecution’s
evidence insufficient to prove his or her guilt before the case is submitted to
the jury, the decision will not be final and therefore will not immediately
acquit the defendant of the offense in question.197 The defendant would also
know that, if the prosecution appealed the trial judge’s ruling and succeeded in
overturning it, his or her trial may be resumed,198 or the defendant could be
subjected to a new trial for the same offense.199
In contrast, once a court-ordered acquittal became “final” and the defendant
was acquitted of the offense in question,200 the Double Jeopardy Clause would
protect the now-acquitted individual from a second prosecution for the same
offense.201 Therefore, the state would still acknowledge “that it respects the
principle of limited government and the liberty of the [citizen].”202
2. Minimizing the Ordeal of the Trial Process
The Double Jeopardy Clause also serves to prevent the government from
“mak[ing] repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal.”203 As
Professor Glanville Williams explained, it would be trying on any defendant,
after expending a large amount of money and energy in obtaining a favorable
verdict, to have to repeat the entire ordeal.204
196. See id. §§ 58(10)–(11), 61(1), (3), (7); see also supra note 160 (arguing that a ruling of
no case to answer might not be final under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 because it provides that
the prosecution can appeal an adverse Court of Appeal ruling).
197. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(1)–(2); cf. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462,
473 (2005) (“If, after a facially unqualified midtrial dismissal of one count [because of the
insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence], the trial has proceeded to the defendant’s
introduction of evidence [on another count of the indictment], the acquittal must be treated as
final, unless the availability of reconsideration has been plainly established by pre-existing rule
or case authority expressly applicable to midtrial rulings on the sufficiency of the evidence.”
(emphasis added)).
198. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(a).
199. See id. § 61(4)(b).
200. See supra notes 193–96 and accompanying text.
201. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
671 (1896).
202. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.17 (noting that the rule
promotes democratic values).
203. Green, 355 U.S. at 187; accord Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977).
204. WILLIAMS, supra note 7, at 164. Although Professor Williams discussed subsequent
prosecutions for a different offense arising from the same facts, this principle is applicable to
autrefois cases as well. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11,
para. 4.6 n.14; see also supra notes 12, 17.
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Presenting an adequate defense to a criminal charge comes with a heavy
financial burden. Defendants with sufficient resources nearly always hire legal
representation205 and may seek out investigators or experts to gather evidence
or to testify at trial.206 Even an indigent defendant can suffer financial burdens
despite the fact that he or she is entitled to state-funded assistance;207 if the
defendant is employed, he or she may miss work for court appearances and
meetings with counsel and could even lose his or her job because of the
pending criminal charge(s).208
Mounting a defense can also cause personal stress, affecting both the
accused and his or her family.209 A criminal charge can be embarrassing,210
and it has the potential to cause disapproval and distrust among family, friends,
and colleagues.211 Consequently, a defendant has reason to be concerned about
the impact of the charge on his or her personal life and, perhaps more
importantly, the possibility of a conviction and subsequent incarceration.212
This apprehension can understandably have both physical and psychological
consequences for the accused.213
“[H]eavy personal strain”214 and financial hardship accompany any criminal
charge; accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause is intended, in part, to
minimize the expense, distress, and trauma caused by the legal process by

205. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (arguing that few criminal
defendants fail to obtain the best lawyers their money can buy).
206. See David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England, Part I: The Exception to the
Rule Against Double Jeopardy for “New and Compelling Evidence,” 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
387, 409–10 & n.111 (2007) (citing several state statutes that authorize payment of expert witness
consultation and investigator fees at the government’s expense).
207. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that, when an indigent
defendant provides evidence that shows his or her sanity will be a significant factor at trial, the
state must provide a psychiatrist to assist the defense); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37
(1972) (holding that an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor, petty offense, or felony
cannot be imprisoned without proper representation); Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339–45 (holding that
an indigent defendant charged with a felony is constitutionally entitled to counsel at state
expense).
208. See NEW SOUTH WALES LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT 77: DIRECTED VERDICTS
OF ACQUITTAL para. 2.12 (1996) [hereinafter NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77].
209. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.7 (stating
that subsequent prosecutions also affect the victims and their families).
210. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661 (1977); Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 187 (1957).
211. Rudstein, supra note 206, at 410.
212. Id.
213. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975).
214. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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precluding a second trial215 in most cases.216 An individual who is acquitted or
convicted of a particular crime need never again face trial for the same
infraction.217 Allowing the prosecution to appeal a midtrial judgment of
acquittal is contradictory to this goal; the defendant will, essentially, be forced
to undergo another proceeding, either by defending him- or herself on appeal
or by withstanding a second trial.218
In those cases in which the prosecution appeals the grant of a motion for
judgment of acquittal, the defendant will still need to appear before the
appellate court; if the defendant is not indigent, he or she will be forced to pay
for the added expense imposed by an appeal.219 Even if appointed counsel
represents the defendant,220 he or she may bear a financial burden during the
pendency of the appeal because of the continued disruption to his or her
employment or business.221
One must remember, however, that a trial judge’s decision to order an
acquittal normally will occur at the conclusion of the prosecution’s
case-in-chief, ending the defendant’s trial (at least for the moment) before the
accused begins presenting his or her defense.222 Arguably, appellate court
215. Abney, 431 U.S. at 661; accord Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 143 n.4 (1986);
Breed, 421 U.S. at 529–30.
216. Second trials for the same offense are sometimes permitted by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 90, § 27.1 (stating that, in general, a convicted felon can
appeal his conviction). Ordinarily, if the defendant’s appeal succeeds, a second trial for the same
offense does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662,
671–72 (1896); see also RUDSTEIN, supra note 68, at 132–48 (outlining the situations in which a
defendant may be prosecuted again, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, after an
acquittal); supra note 71 and accompanying text; infra notes 233–36, 270–72 and accompanying
text.
217. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
218. See David S. Rudstein, Retrying the Acquitted in England Part III: Prosecution Appeals
Against Judges’ Rulings of “No Case to Answer,” 13 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 5, 104 (2011).
219. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.12. A defense
attorney retained on a flat-fee basis will charge an additional fee to represent the individual on an
interlocutory appeal. E-mail from Richard Kling, Clinical Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, to author (May 21, 2012, 11:00 CDT) (on file with author).
220. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-584 (2012); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 717
(McKinney 2004).
221. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.12. Assuming the
prosecution obtains leave to appeal, the severity of this financial burden may depend on the
length of time it takes the court to decide the appeal. In England, many defendants are forced to
wait for more than six months from the date of the trial court decision. See, e.g., R v. S.H.,
[2010] EWCA (Crim) 1931, [1]–[2] (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org.ew/cases/EWCA
/crim/2012/1931.html (acquitting the defendant on July 13, 2009, and deciding the appeal on
August 3, 2010); R v. N.T., [2010] EWCA (Crim) 711, [1] (Eng.), 2010 WL 910162 (staying
indictment on August 12, 2009, and issuing an appellate opinion on March 31, 2010).
222. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (citing the time period “[a]fter the government closes
its evidence” as an appropriate juncture at which the court may grant a defendant’s timely motion
for a judgment of acquittal).
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proceedings can be considered a surrogate for the remainder of the defendant’s
trial. Although the defendant must still counter the government’s appeal, it is
unlikely that the defendant will face the same difficulties of a trial.223 The
appeal is likely to be less demanding on the defendant, in large part because
the trial judge has already rendered a decision, in the defendant’s favor, on the
merits of the case.224 Conversely, the appellate process could last longer than
the time it would take to present a defense;225 therefore, any inconvenience or
hardship could eclipse that caused by merely enduring the completion of the
defendant’s original trial.226 In conjunction with these concerns, non-indigent
defendants may incur additional expenses that they would not have had they
continued in the trial court.227 Consequently, a motion for judgment of
acquittal and subsequent appeal could presumably result in a needless increase
in the defendant’s anxiety and hardship because of the criminal process.228
Moreover, if the appellate court overturns the decision and orders a new trial,
the defendant will suffer the negative effects of the appeal as well as those of a
second trial,229 frustrating a primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.230
It is true, of course, that double jeopardy does not categorically preclude a
second trial for the same offense.231 For example, a second trial is permissible
in the event of a mistrial,232 whether at the request of the defendant,233 or
223. Cf. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980) (stating that a prosecution’s
review of the accused’s sentence does not involve the same trials and tribulations involved in a
retrial or original prosecution).
224. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (requiring the trial judge to grant the defendant’s request for
acquittal if the prosecution fails to present sufficient evidence). If this decision is appealable, the
defendant will still face the possibility of reversal and relitigation as well as the effects of
continued proceedings on his personal life. See supra notes 193–99, 219–21 and accompanying
text.
225. See supra note 221 (noting that many defendants in England have had to wait more than
six months before their appeals were decided). Even if the appellate court issued a decision
within a matter of days, this could still exceed the duration of the trial following the government’s
case-in-chief. See, e.g., R v. J.G., [2006] EWCA (Crim) 3276, [1] (Eng.), 2006 WL 3485353
(dismissing the appeal from the trial court within four days).
226. One way to limit the trial’s negative effects would be to expedite prosecutorial appeals.
Because of the issue’s narrow scope, the court could decide the case quickly. See supra note 224.
227. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
228. See NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.13 (“If, in fact,
there were no mistake, and, ultimately, an appeal court were to find the original verdict of
acquittal sound, then the accused has faced an unnecessary emotional and financial burden.”).
229. Alternatively, the appellate court might order the resumption of the defendant’s initial
trial, which, by analogy, could cause prolonged anxiety, embarrassment, or expense. See
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(a) (Eng.).
230. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text (stating that one of the major purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to avoid the consequences of relitigating the same offense).
231. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
232. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607–08 (1976) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 481 (1971) (plurality opinion)). A new trial is also permissible when a convicted
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granted sua sponte by the trial judge because of the jury’s inability to reach a
verdict,234 or some other valid reason.235 In such situations, however, a
decision has not been reached on the merits, so a second trial may be
appropriate in the interest of justice to resolve the question of the defendant’s
guilt or innocence.236 Fairness dictates that, because the defendant sought the
end of his or her own trial before the trier of fact could consider the case,
holding a second trial does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.237 Indeed,
by allowing his or her trial to end based on error rather than the substance of
the charge, the defendant most likely anticipates a second trial.238
This rationale for permitting a second trial is not applicable when a trial
judge incorrectly grants a motion for judgment of acquittal based on
insufficient evidence. An acquittal differs fundamentally from a mistrial
because there is a decision on the merits of the case. This creates a sense of
finality, recognized by the Double Jeopardy Clause, that is not a component of
a mistrial.239 By seeking this midtrial determination of culpability, the
defendant successfully appeals his conviction on the basis of trial error. United States v. Ball,
163 U.S. 662, 671–72 (1896); see also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465–66 (1971)
(articulating the rationale for allowing a second trial); infra text accompanying notes 270,
272–74 (discussing the reason for distinguishing the prosecution’s appeal of an acquittal from the
defendant’s appeal for error).
233. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607–08, 611 (1976) (explaining that a second trial does not
contravene the Double Jeopardy Clause even if the defendant’s request is necessitated by judicial
or prosecutorial error); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982) (excluding
situations in which the prosecution engaged in conduct “intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into
moving for [the] mistrial” from the list of exceptions to the Double Jeopardy Clause).
234. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (finding that the court can
discharge a jury’s duty to render a verdict).
235. Id. (holding that a second trial is permissible following a trial judge’s declaration of a
mistrial even without the defendant’s consent because “there is a manifest necessity for the act, or
the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”); see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S.
Ct. 2044, 2050 (2012) (“[A] trial can be discontinued without barring a subsequent one for the
same offense when ‘particular circumstances manifest a necessity’ to declare a mistrial.” (quoting
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690 (1949))).
236. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing the public interest in
criminal proceedings of obtaining a verdict, regardless of whether it is an acquittal or a
conviction).
237. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 607–08 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 485) (distinguishing a mistrial
requested by the defendant from one granted sua sponte, and finding that a second trial in this
context was consistent with the Double Jeopardy Clause).
238. See id. (considering a defendant’s request for a mistrial strategic in that he or she may
do so in order to receive a fair trial absent misconduct). Trial courts, in granting mistrials, most
likely also anticipate that a defendant will be retried. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92
(1978).
239. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896) (considering a judgment of acquittal
“final” and “conclusive”). Contra RUDSTEIN, supra note 68, at 132 (“[S]ome criminal trials end
without a final judgment of acquittal or conviction. A ‘mistrial’ occurs when a judge terminates a
trial without a determination of the factual guilt or innocence of the accused, either because of
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defendant has demonstrated a desire to end the proceedings permanently.240
The government may be precluded from challenging the validity of this
acquittal241 because, unlike a mistrial, a trial judge has rendered a decision
based on the sufficiency of the evidence and on the defendant’s guilt or
innocence.242
That the trial judge may have incorrectly acquitted a defendant is not the
fault of the defendant; therefore the defendant should not be required to
mitigate the Court’s mistake by having to undergo the hardships of a new
trial.243 Although a trial judge is, by nature, a neutral party, the judge is an
official state employee.244 Why, then, should the state be permitted to rectify
its own mistake at the defendant’s expense? As one Australian jurist
explained, “[i]f the [trial] judge makes a mistake and the accused is acquitted,
then the setting aside of the verdict may involve the accused in the emotional
ordeal of going through it all again, although the mistake was something over
which he had no control.”245 It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the
ability to appeal a decision of acquittal, thus allowing for a second trial if that
appeal succeeds, contravenes the Double Jeopardy Clause by prolonging the
ordeal beyond a single trial.
3. Reducing the Risk of an Erroneous Conviction
Precluding a second trial following acquittal prevents the government from
attempting to persuade a second fact-finder of the defendant’s guilt “after
having failed with the first,”246 thereby reducing the risk of erroneously
procedural error, serious misconduct, or some other event making it impossible or impracticable
to complete the trial.”).
240. See Ball, 163 U.S. at 671 (describing “the verdict of acquittal [as] conclusive in favor
of” the defendant and releasing him). Contra Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (holding that “the defendant
elected to seek termination of the trial on grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. This is
scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been
found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier
of fact.” (emphasis added)); id. at 98–99 (“[T]“he defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek
termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of
the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause
if the [g]overnment is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in favor of the
defendant.” (emphasis added)).
241. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
242. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) (providing that a trial judge makes his or her decision on the
merits of the government’s case).
243. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.13.
244. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 298. Judges are generally compensated by the state
pursuant to statute. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-17-68 (LexisNexis 2005) (explaining that district
judges are compensated by the state); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-128 (2003) (dividing the
payment of judges’ salaries equally between the state and the county); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 75-3120g (Supp. 2009) (providing the exact salary to be paid to district judges).
245. R v Jessop, [1974] Tas SR 64, 87 (Crim. App.) (Austl.) (Chambers, J, dissenting).
246. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352 (1975).
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convicting an innocent person.247 As the Supreme Court recognized in Green
v. United States, if the government were allowed to repeatedly attempt to
prosecute an individual for an offense, innocent people could be convicted.248
The risk of an erroneous conviction would increase for a number of reasons.
First, an innocent person faced with additional trials for the same offense, even
after being acquitted, might decide to plead guilty to avoid the possibility of
numerous trials.249 Second, and more importantly, permitting a second trial for
the same offense, despite an acquittal, would allow the government to use the
first trial as a “dress rehearsal”250 to hear the defendant’s arguments251 and
thereby “hon[e] its trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence.”252 Third, if the
government could repeatedly prosecute an individual for the same crime, it
247. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (stating that the increased chances of convicting an
innocent person at a second trial for the same offense “is at the core of the problem”).
248. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957); see also ENG. LAW COMM’N,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.5; AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE,
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 21, at 2 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187–88).
249. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4.
250. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 749 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in
part and dissenting in part); see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 518 (1990) (“Multiple
prosecutions . . . give the State an opportunity to rehearse its presentation of proof . . . .”),
overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. 688.
251. It can also assess the defendant’s case and change its strategies accordingly. With the
knowledge of both parties’ strengths and weaknesses, the prosecution could “supply evidence
which it failed to muster in the first proceeding.” Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982)
(quoting Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)). Professor Friedland writes that, at a
second trial, the defendant
may be at a greater disadvantage than he was at the first trial because he will normally
have disclosed his complete defence at the former trial. Moreover, he may have
entered the witness-box himself. The prosecutor can study the transcript and may
thereby find apparent defects and inconsistencies in the defence evidence to use at the
second trial.
FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4; see also ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156,
supra note 11, para. 4.5 (“[B]ecause there has already been one trial at which the defence has
shown its hand, the prosecution may enjoy a tactical advantage at a second trial; and this will
increase the likelihood of a conviction, whether the defendant is guilty or innocent.”); ENG. LAW
COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 7.65 (“[A]t a retrial witnesses will have had a
dry run, tactics will have been revealed and weaknesses in the prosecution case will have been
spotted and possibly plugged.”). Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970) (discussing how
a prosecutor who lost the first trial, like any “good attorney would do,” adopted a new approach at
the defendant’s second trial for an offense based on the same event as the charge in the first trial);
Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1958) (explaining how the State, following an
acquittal, altered its presentation of proof at the defendant’s second trial—for an offense based on
the same event as the charge in the defendant’s first trial—by calling only the witness who had
testified most favorably to it in the first trial).
252. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41. The prosecution can alter its approach based on the weakness of
its own case. See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S 117, 128 (1980); United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S.
332, 352 (1975).
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could, with its vastly superior resources,253 wear down the
defendant—financially, emotionally, and physically254—and obtain a
conviction “through sheer governmental perseverance.”255 Finally, if it is
accepted that juries do sometimes return perverse verdicts unsupported by the
evidence,256 repeated attempts at conviction will result in a higher probability
that the accused will be found guilty eventually.257 In sum, as Professor Akhil
Reed Amar and Jonathan L. Marcus eloquently stated, “[i]f you play with
something long enough, you are likely to break it; and if the government is
allowed to prosecute an innocent defendant enough times and disregard all
acquittals, eventually it is likely to convict an innocent (by hypothesis)
person.”258
A statute or court rule that allows the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s
decision to acquit will frustrate this purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.259
Whenever the prosecution, acting in good faith, brings an individual to trial on
a criminal charge, it presumably believes it has sufficient evidence to prove the
individual’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.260 During the trial, the
prosecution may learn that its belief was misplaced when the jury acquits the
defendant, but the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents the prosecution from
strengthening its case and bringing subsequent claims against the acquitted
253. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV.
1477, 1505 n.59 (1999) (citing a statistic that cities with a population of one million or more
budget over $25 million for the local prosecutor’s office). In his article, Posner goes on to note
that defense counsel, especially those who are court-appointed, are subject to strict budgetary
constraints, and that the high burden of proof is only a “partial offset” to the inequality of party
resources. Id. at 1505.
254. See supra notes 205–13 and accompanying text.
255. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 41; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (arguing that often the
accused will not have the energy or finances to withstand another prosecution).
256. BLACK’S, supra note 16, at 1697 (defining a “perverse verdict” as “[a] verdict so
contrary to the evidence that it justifies the granting of a new trial”).
257. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.5 (stating
that, if nothing else, the prosecution has a chance to improve its case because it has seen the
defense’s arguments in the first trial).
258. Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy After Rodney King, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31 n.158 (1995) (declaring that one purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is
to protect the innocent); see also Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 278 n.74
(1965) (attempting to illustrate the heightened probability of conviction after repeated attempts).
259. See NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.6 (stating that
allowing acquittal appeals may result in a retrial and that the accused at the second trial will likely
be more prejudiced than before); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Judicial
Accountability: When Is an Acquittal Not an Acquittal?, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 953, 977 (1995)
(“Th[e] risk [that the prosecution will convict an innocent defendant] is most acute when either
the court or the jury has assessed the prosecution’s case and found it wanting.”).
260. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3–3.9 (1986) (“A prosecutor should not
institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges in the
absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.”).
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individual for the same offense.261 When, however, a trial judge decides at the
close of the prosecution’s case that the evidence presented is insufficient to
prove the defendant’s guilt, the prosecution learns at an earlier stage that its
evidence is weaker than it initially believed. Yet, allowing the prosecution to
appeal this ruling may result in a retrial for the same offense,262 in which the
prosecution will likely present more evidence to overcome the initial
acquittal.263 Even if the appellate court were correct and the prosecution did
present a prima facie case of guilt at the trial level, the prosecution will have
been put on notice that, at least in the eyes of the trial judge, its case against the
defendant was not strong and therefore will make efforts to strengthen its case
at the second trial.264
Cases in which the trial judge has outlined the weakness of the prosecutions’
evidence are particularly troubling because the prosecution will have a guide
book identifying the areas in which it needs to strengthen its case at the
retrial.265 Presenting additional evidence and working with witnesses are just
two ways the prosecution can adjust its approach in the second trial so as to
improve its chances of obtaining a conviction.266 The result of the appeal is to
make the first trial simply a “dry run” so that the prosecution can practice its
strategy.267 As the English Law Commission explained,
the defence may have tested [the prosecution’s evidence] in
cross-examination. In doing so the defence may have revealed some
or all of its strategy, although it will not have begun to present its
case. It may also have provided the prosecution witnesses who have
given evidence with a ‘dry run.’ Accordingly, in these ways the
261. See supra text accompanying notes 75–80.
262. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.).
263. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. The only exception might be when the
appellate court reverses the trial judge’s ruling because the trial judge based his or her ruling on
the absence of any evidence of what the trial judge erroneously concluded constituted a required
element of the offense. Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, 40 J.
LEGAL STUD. 273, 278–79 (2011).
If the appellate court orders the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial, rather than a
new trial, the prosecution would almost certainly seek to reopen its case to present additional
evidence when the trial is resumed. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(a).
264. Poulin, supra note 259, at 977.
265. Id. (concluding that, in cases in which reasoning accompanies the verdict, the
prosecution has even more incentive to correct the deficiency in its case).
266. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 439–40 (1970) (discussing how the prosecution
elicited stronger identification from three witnesses who testified at the defendant’s first trial and
how it declined to call the victim whose identification testimony at the first trial and had been
negative); see also Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 465–66 (1958) (detailing how the State
altered its presentation of proof by calling only the witness who had testified that the defendant
was the robber in his first trial).
267. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447 (noting that the State, in its brief, admitted that after the acquittal
it treated the first trial as merely a practice run).
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defence would be disadvantaged at a retrial by facing a prosecution
potentially better prepared.268
Retrials are a routine feature of the criminal justice system in the United
States, occurring most frequently after a defendant successfully appeals his or
her conviction on the basis of trial error269 or after the trial judge declares a
mistrial.270 Retrials are permitted in these situations even though the
prosecution is likely to have an additional advantage over the defendant at the
second trial.271 Consequently, it could be argued that the prosecution’s ability
to strengthen its case at a retrial following the prosecution’s successful appeal
of a midtrial acquittal ruling should not be a reason for barring the prosecution
from taking such appeals. This reasoning, however, is flawed. Just because
the legal system sometimes allows the prosecution to enjoy an additional
advantage over the defendant at a retrial does not mean it should always permit
it to do so. The prosecution’s ability to strengthen its case at a retrial raises a
concern because it increases the possibility that an innocent person will be
convicted.272 Furthermore, each of the situations mentioned above, where
retrials are common, are distinguishable from the situation in which a retrial
follows the reversal of a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal ruling.
When a defendant appeals his or her conviction on the ground that error
infected the trial, the defendant is the one asking that the case not end with the
judgment entered upon the jury’s guilty verdict. At the time the defendant
appeals, it would seem that he or she would be quite content if the appellate
court overturned the conviction and granted a new trial, even though the
prosecution might have an additional advantage at a second trial. That
certainly is not the case when the prosecution appeals a trial judge’s decision
to order an acquittal. Should the appellate court disagree with the trial judge
and remand the case for a new trial, or a resumption of the initial trial, the
defendant will be forced to surrender a favorable decision that would have
forever ended the case for that offense.273 In addition, the defendant may be
forced to undergo a second trial at which he or she is likely to be at an
268. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 15, para. 6.3 (stating,
however, that there is the possibility that differing accounts from witnesses may make available to
the defense a challenge to the prosecution witnesses’ credibility).
269. See supra notes 71, 216, 232.
270. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text.
271. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 158, supra note 15, para. 6.3. On the
other hand, the extent of the additional advantage may depend upon the stage at which the
defendant’s first trial ended. See supra notes 262–68 (discussing those advantages assumed when
a trial judge rules at the end of the prosecution’s case). The prosecution is likely to have learned
very little about the defense’s case, or any weaknesses in its own case, when the first trial ended
before the prosecution began presenting its evidence, such as during the prosecutor’s opening
statement.
272. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 186–87 (1957).
273. See supra notes 68–69, 75–81 and accompanying text.
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additional disadvantage.274 In short, although it may be fair to retry a
convicted defendant who seeks to overturn a conviction and obtain a new trial,
it would be unfair to compel a defendant who has benefitted from the initial
acquittal to undergo a new trial.
As explained previously, when there is a hung jury, no decision in the case is
made.275 Moreover, neither party can be blamed for the jury’s inability to
reach a decision. Under such circumstances, the interests of justice require a
second trial for the same offense so that the charges against the defendant can
be resolved.276 Prohibiting a retrial in such situations would frustrate the
public interest in resolving the charges against the accused277 and would
effectively eliminate the requirement that a prescribed number of jurors agree
upon a “not guilty” verdict for an acquittal.278 Unlike the case of a hung jury,
however, when a trial judge decides to order an acquittal, there will be (absent
a right of appeal) a decision in the case. Furthermore, even if the trial judge
erred in finding that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof, that
error can be attributed to an agent of the state—the trial judge279—and the
defendant should not be penalized for that error by being forced to undergo a
new trial.280
Similarly, unlike the trial judge’s decision to order an acquittal, the
declaration of a mistrial during the defendant’s initial trial because of some
error ends that trial without a determination of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence. Therefore, it can be argued that the interests of justice require the
case against the defendant be resolved one way or the other.281 Moreover,
when the trial judge declares a mistrial at the defendant’s request or with his or
her consent, the defendant contemplates being tried again for the same
offense.282 Indeed, in most situations where the defendant moves for a
274. See supra notes 263–72 (stating ways in which a prosecution takes advantage of a
second trial).
275. See supra notes 235, 237 and accompanying text.
276. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
277. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 463 (1973) (recognizing that the public has an
“interest[] . . . in seeing that a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict, either of acquittal or
conviction”).
278. A jury verdict, whether a conviction or an acquittal, requires either unanimity, or in
some states, the agreement of a specified number of jurors. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 90,
§ 22.1(e) (requiring unanimity); see also LA. CONST. art. 1, § 17 (requiring the agreement of ten
members of a twelve-person jury to convict the accused in a non-capital case); OR. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11 (specifying the consonance of ten jurors for criminal trials to support guilt).
279. See supra notes 244–45 and accompanying text.
280. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.13.
281. See Somerville, 410 U.S. at 463 (recognizing the public interest in having a final
decision made).
282. See United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 608 (1976). The trial court, in granting the
mistrial, most likely also contemplated that the defendant would be retried. United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978) (“When a trial court declares a mistrial, it all but invariably
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mistrial, he or she wants a retrial because the defendant thinks the error would
increase the chances of being convicted at the first trial and would necessitate a
retrial following a successful appeal.283 On the other hand, when a defendant
moves for a directed verdict of not guilty or its equivalent, he or she seeks to
end the trial with a decision regarding guilt or innocence.284
Thus, although retrials in criminal cases occur with some frequency in the
United States, such retrials should be limited to those situations in which a
convicted defendant successfully appeals a conviction or to those in which
there was no decision in the case. Such a limitation will minimize the number
of cases in which the prosecution’s upper hand may lead to the conviction of
an innocent person.
4. Protecting the Power of the Jury to Acquit Against the Evidence
Another purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause identified by the Supreme
Court is to protect the prerogative of the jury, acting “as the conscience of the
community in applying the law,”285 “to acquit against the evidence,”286 where
application of the law and subsequent conviction would be unjust.287 A jury
may exercise this power to “nullify” the law in a particular case for a variety of
reasons,288 including its belief that the conduct in question should not be a

contemplates that the prosecutor will be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the
defendant’s plea of double jeopardy.”).
283. See Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 608, 610 (stating that the immediate request for a retrial is
preferable to the lengthy process of going through with the trial, having an appeal, and then a
retrial).
284. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 96 (“[T]he defendant elected to seek termination of the trial on
grounds unrelated to guilt or innocence. This is scarcely a picture of an all-powerful state
relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least
insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact.” (emphasis added)); see
also id. at 98–99 (declaring that a defendant’s request for trial termination on a procedural issue
rather than one of guilt does not preclude a government appeal of the defendant’s favorable
ruling).
285. Westen & Drubel, supra note 90, at 130.
286. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 n.11 (1980) (quoting Westen, supra
note 90, at 1063) (internal quotations marks omitted).
287. Westen & Drubel, supra note 90, at 130 (stating that “erroneous acquittals” can be
explained as an extralegal judgment to acquit by a jury); see also Westen, supra note 90, at 1063
(finding one prohibition on retrial to be the jury’s prerogative to “acquit against the evidence”).
288. See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 11
(1998) (discussing the design and “mounting [of] a jury nullification defense”); see also LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 90, § 22.1(g).
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crime289 or its feeling that the punishment for the crime in question is too
severe.290
Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s acquittal does not
frustrate this policy because the acquittal ends the case, at least temporarily, in
the defendant’s favor before the jury decides whether to nullify the law and
acquit the defendant despite its finding the defendant committed the crime in
question. Moreover, although a defendant possesses the right to have a trial
completed by a particular tribunal,291 especially one believed by him or her to
be favorable,292 a request for a court-ordered acquittal has taken the verdict
decision from that particular jury and given it to the judge.293 By doing so, the
defendant has deliberately elected “to forgo his [or her] valued right to have his
[or her] guilt or innocence determined” by the jury hearing the case.294 A
defendant who believes that the jury would acquit him or her, regardless of the
evidence of guilt, can refrain from moving for a directed verdict and allow the
case to run its course. Having chosen instead to request the directed verdict,
the defendant is unable to convincingly claim that allowing the prosecution to
appeal the trial judge’s decision interferes with the policy of allowing the jury
to acquit against the evidence.
5. Preventing the Government from Harassing an Individual
The guarantee against double jeopardy is also intended “to prevent the
harassment of the accused by repeated prosecution for the same matter.”295
Allowing the government to prosecute an individual for the same offense
following an acquittal would grant the government a power that “could be used
289. See, e.g., Three Acquitted of Mercy Killing, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN (Austl.), Oct. 24,
2001, 2001 WLNR 5392278 (showing that juries may be unwilling to render guilty verdicts for
the murder of terminally ill patients).
290. CONRAD, supra note 288, at 147–49 (noting that some judges have faulted in affecting
jury deliberations by revealing the punishment or using adjectives such as “draconian” to
characterize the punishment); see also KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 28, at 306–12 (claiming a
threatened penalty may overwhelm jury deliberations).
291. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 36 (1978) (citing Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689
(1949)).
292. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 514 (1978) (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 486 (1971) (plurality opinion)).
293. LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 1.8(i) (stating that most jurisdictions allow directed verdicts
of acquittals); see also, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1118.1 (West 2004);
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(a); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 25(a).
294. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1978) (arguing that the important
consideration to keep in mind is that the defendant has control over procedural matters in the
event of a mistrial); see also United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976).
295. NEW ZEALAND LAW COMMISSION, REPORT 70: ACQUITTAL FOLLOWING PERVERSION
OF THE COURSE OF JUSTICE para. 12 (2001) [hereinafter NZ LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70]; see also
NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.8 (finding that double jeopardy
principles seek to prevent the undue prolongation of criminal trials).
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illegitimately by ill-intentioned state servants.”296 In the absence of a rule
against double jeopardy, it is possible that “the police, unhappy at [an
individual’s] being found not guilty, would unfairly pursue the person in order
to try to bring about a second trial,”297 or that a “disgruntled prosecutor” who
disagrees with the verdict could attempt to prosecute a second time or search
for additional evidence to bring the charge once more.298 Even if the second
trial again resulted in the defendant’s acquittal, or if the police and the
prosecutor were unable to discover additional evidence and did not prosecute
the defendant a second time for the same offense, they may be satisfied with
having caused the person additional embarrassment, anxiety, and perhaps
expense arising from the second trial or the continued investigation.299
Therefore, without any safeguards prohibiting the prosecution to appeal a trial
judge’s acquittal, a statute or court rule allowing such devices could open the
door to government harassment of a seemingly acquitted defendant, frustrating
the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.300
The appeal process authorized by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, however,
includes a significant safeguard for individuals who benefit from a trial judge’s
ruling that the prosecution failed to prove its case,301 which suggests that
similar statutes or court rules are unlikely to permit government harassment.
Such a statute or court rule would allow the prosecution to appeal a trial
judge’s decision to order an acquittal only after obtaining leave to appeal from
either the trial judge or the appellate court.302 It is unlikely that a court would
grant such leave if it suspected that the prosecution sought to appeal merely to
harass the accused.303 Such an oversight provision would enhance the
296. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 4.14.
297. SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THIRD REPORT, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
RULE para. 19 (2000), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900
/cmselect/cmhaff/190/19002.htm [hereinafter SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE].
298. Thompson v Mastertouch T.V. Serv. Pty. Ltd. (No. 3), (1978) 38 FLR 397, 408 (Fed. Ct.
Austl.) (Deane, J, with Smithers & Riley, JJ, concurring) (speculating that departure from double
jeopardy principles would subject appeals to prosecutorial whims); see also FRIEDLAND, supra
note 91, at 3–4 (stating that the main purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent
unwarranted harassment as a result of repeated prosecution for the same offense); AUSTRALIAN
MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 21, at 2 (stating that one of the policies
underlying the rule against double jeopardy is citizen protection from state harassment).
299. See supra text accompanying notes 219–30.
300. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
301. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 57(4) (Eng.) (requiring leave to be granted by a
judge or the Court of Appeal).
302. Id.
303. See R v. Al-Ali, [2009] EWCA 2186, [8], 1 W.L.R. 1661 [8] (Eng.) (stating that the
appellate court and trial judge could be required to “look rather more widely at the interests of
justice than simply . . . ask[ing] [itself] . . . whether an appeal has a realistic prospect of success,
or some other test directed solely at the merits of the appeal.”). Appeals undertaken by the
prosecution merely to harass the accused would be unlikely to meet this standard.
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probability that courts would weed out any appeals undertaken by the
prosecution merely for the purpose of obtaining a second trial to harass the
“acquitted” individual, thereby protecting the accused from government
harassment.
Moreover, because the prosecution would be required to request an appeal
directly following the opposed ruling304 or following an adjournment up until
the next day,305 and because the trial judge must decide whether to allow leave
to appeal on the day it is requested,306 no significant time will elapse between
the trial judge’s directed verdict and the denial of leave by the court. Although
it may take longer for the appellate court to consider and deny an application
for leave to appeal, any harassment of the accused by the prosecution from
only seeking leave to appeal will be minor.
Even if an unscrupulous prosecutor successfully disguises his or her
intention to obtain a new trial merely to harass the “acquitted” individual and
manages to obtain leave to appeal, a second trial could occur only if the
appellate court finds that the trial judge erred in ruling that the prosecution’s
evidence failed to establish the defendant’s guilt.307 Unlike in a legal system
that fails to recognize the rule against double jeopardy, a second trial in this
system could not be brought solely at the prosecution’s whim. The existence
of such oversight makes it probable that appeals filed by the prosecution
merely to harass the “acquitted” individual would be identified by the appellate
court and the “acquitted” individual would not have to undergo a second trial
for the same offense. This oversight would also result in lower anxiety and
expense on the part of the defendants who would be exposed to the appellate
process rather than a second trial.308
6. Conserving Scarce Prosecutorial and Judicial Resources
Precluding subsequent prosecutions for the same offense following an
acquittal also helps to conserve scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources. It
prevents the government from spending additional time, money, and effort
investigating and prosecuting an acquitted individual until it achieves a

304. Criminal Procedure Rules, 2011, S.I. 2011/1709, 67.5(1)(a) (Eng.).
305. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(4)(a)(ii); Criminal Procedure Rules, 67.2(2)(b),
67.5(1)(b).
306. See Criminal Procedure Rules, 67.5(4).
307. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(5).
308. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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conviction.309 It also prevents prosecutors from monopolizing courtrooms,
judges, and court personnel in successive attempts to obtain a conviction.310
Allowing the prosecution to appeal a court-ordered acquittal frustrates this
policy. Absent a right to appeal, a trial judge’s decision to direct a verdict of
not guilty would end the case in favor of the accused and would force the
prosecution to move on to its next case without further depleting its funds and
abusing court resources.311 In a legal system that permits the prosecution to
appeal a court-ordered acquittal, a prosecutor who files an appeal will spend
additional time, money, and effort on a case that has already been “decided.”
Given the limited resources generally available to the prosecution, this means
that an appeal of an acquittal will divert time and resources from cases that
have yet to be tried.312 If the prosecution succeeds in its appeal and obtains a
new trial313 or is allowed to resume the initial trial,314 it will have to divert
further resources from untried cases to undertake the defendant’s new or
resumed trial.315 The reduced amount of time, effort, and money spent on
some of these untried cases could result in acquittals that would otherwise have
been convictions. Moreover, if the prosecution’s appeal fails316 or the
defendant is acquitted following the prosecution’s successful appeal, the
prosecution’s diversion of its limited resources will have been for naught.
Allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s directed acquittal also
diverts limited judicial resources.317 Instead of dealing with pending appeals,
such as those involving convicted defendants who might be innocent, appellate
court judges will be deciding appeals of court-ordered acquittals. Similarly,
when the appellate court reverses a court-ordered acquittal and orders a new
trial, or the resumption of the defendant’s initial trial, the trial court might have
309. Cf. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 438–39 (1970) (involving a case in which Missouri
brought a charge for robbing one of six victims and altered its approach after the defendant was
acquitted in his initial trial for robbing another of the victims); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464,
465–66 (1958) (involving a case in which the State tried the defendant for robbing a fourth person
after he was acquitted in his initial trial for robbing three others in the same incident).
310. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (stating that it is not only the individual, but also the
legal system itself that is protected).
311. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.28.
312. See State v. McFarland, 899 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Wash. 1995) (discussing how appeals can
tax limited judicial resources).
313. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.).
314. See id. § 61(4)(a).
315. It may also divert resources from pending appeals. See supra note 312 (noting that
resources may be diverted from the judicial process).
316. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 57(4), (8)–(9) (stating that the appeal would fail if the
prosecution did not obtain leave to appeal); see id. § 66(1), 2(c) (stating that the appeal fails if the
appellate court confirms the trial judge’s ruling or reverses that ruling but nevertheless orders the
acquittal because it concludes that the defendant could not receive a fair trial at either a new trial
or the resumption of his initial trial. See id. § 61(4)(c), (5).
317. See supra notes 310–16 and accompanying text.
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to delay other trials so that it can conduct the retrial or resume the defendant’s
initial trial. This result could allow a guilty defendant to be free in the
community on bail or an innocent person to be held in custody awaiting trial.
7. Maintaining the Public’s Respect for, and Confidence in, the Legal
System
As Professor Martin L. Friedland points out, the rule against double jeopardy
protects both defendants and the criminal justice system itself.318 Protecting
the accused from state harassment and giving consistent rulings maintains the
public’s respect and confidence in the legal process.319 The public would
almost certainly lose respect for the legal system if the government were
allowed to prosecute an individual repeatedly for the same offense, despite
consistent acquittals. In most cases, the public would perceive the multiple
prosecutions as government harassment.320 Moreover, if the government
ultimately obtained a conviction after a previous acquittal, the inconsistent
verdicts could affect the public’s confidence in the accuracy of the legal
system and dilute the moral force of criminal law321 because it would “leave[]
people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”322
Members of the community also might view a right to appeal a
court-ordered acquittal as a governmental tool to dismantle what would
otherwise be an acquittal. The public may ultimately conclude that the
government is not always bound by an acquittal with which it disagrees and
that citizens, therefore, are not adequately protected, particularly if significant
numbers of court-ordered acquittals are overturned. Moreover, the greater the
number of court-ordered acquittals the appellate courts reverse, the more likely
the public will question the legal ability of the trial judges. Perhaps more
importantly, many may ask: If trial judges cannot determine whether the
prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, are they competent to address other “less important” issues
that could ultimately lead to an innocent person’s conviction or a guilty
individual’s acquittal? Questions could also arise about the appellate court
judges’ legal ability if subsequent proceedings323 following an overturned
acquittal result in the jury finding the defendant not guilty.
318. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4; see also NZ LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note
295, para. 14 (“A consequence of the rule against double jeopardy is protection of the
administration of justice itself.”).
319. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4.
320. See NZ LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 295, para. 14.
321. Id.
322. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (arguing that the reasonable doubt standard is
necessary so that the public has faith in the “moral force of criminal law”).
323. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 61(4)(b) (Eng.) (ordering a new trial after
acquittal); see also id. § 61(4)(a) (ordering a resumption of the initial trial).
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When, however, a jury convicts an accused following a reversal of an
acquittal, members of the community might conclude that the existence of the
right to appeal prevented a miscarriage of justice that would have resulted in a
guilty individual’s acquittal, and may thereby gain confidence in the legal
system. Indeed, absent a right of appeal on the part of the prosecution,
acquittals in cases involving serious offenses can give rise to anger and
frustration in the community,324 and can cause the public to lose faith in the
criminal justice system.325 But such cases are likely to be rare because a judge
is not likely to intervene in those serious cases in which credible evidence can
be put before a jury.326 Perhaps more importantly, some guilty defendants will
not be convicted, but the public may recognize this and accept this balance as a
part of the criminal process.327 On balance, then, it seems that the negative
effect on the community’s respect for the legal system outweighs any positive
effect it may have, and therefore will, to some extent, frustrate this purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
8. Encouraging Efficient Investigation and Prosecution
As a general matter, allowing the government to retry an acquitted
individual for the same offense could lead to the police failing to investigate
offenses initially and prosecutors initially not prosecuting cases as diligently as
they otherwise might.328 Both the police and prosecutors would know that, if

324. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 3.5 (recognizing that
the public would be upset in the event that a defendant accused of a serious crime was acquitted
without the jury’ having the opportunity to weigh the evidence or without the prosecution having
a chance to appeal, but also citing a senior public defender as stating that it was rare for a judge to
direct a verdict in a murder case); see also Stan Grossfeld, Locked in on the Hoop, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 10, 2008, at C5 (stating that the not guilty verdict in O.J. Simpson’s murder trial
“polarized America along racial lines”); Angry Callers Flood Times Switchboard, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1992, at A23 (reporting that shortly after the announcement of the verdict acquitting four
white Los Angeles police officers on charges brought in connection with the videotaped beating
of Rodney King, the Los Angeles Times switchboard was flooded with angry calls from the
public).
325. ENG. LAW COMM’N, REPORT NO. 267, supra note 11, para. 7.56; NSW LAW REFORM
COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 2.15.
326. NSW LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT 77, supra note 208, para. 3.5.
327. FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (stating that there is no way to tell if a defendant is in
this class, so it is something that is inevitable).
328. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11;
AUSTRALIAN MODEL CRIMINAL CODE, DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 21, at 2; see also
FRIEDLAND, supra note 91, at 4 (“It is to the first trial . . . that [the] efforts [of the police] should
be directed.”); SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY RULE, supra
note 297, para. 19 (noting that one of the arguments against creating exceptions to the traditional
rule barring retrial following an acquittal is that “a second opportunity to prosecute would
encourage the police to be less thorough in their initial investigation”); Dennis, supra note 95, at
941.
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the first prosecution failed, they would get a “second bite at the apple”329 and
could spend more time on the investigation and prosecution at the second trial.
Allowing the government only one opportunity to convict an individual of an
offense “operates as a powerful incentive to efficient and exhaustive
investigation”330 and prosecution.331
Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that a statute or court rule permitting the
prosecution to appeal a court-ordered acquittal and to retry a defendant, or
resume his or her initial trial, would cause police and prosecutors to be less
efficient in their initial investigation and prosecution of crimes. When police
are investigating a crime and prosecutors are preparing for a criminal trial, they
have every incentive, given the rule against double jeopardy, to obtain and
present as much evidence as possible to establish an individual’s guilt.
Limiting the scope of an investigation or the amount of evidence presented at
trial could increase the chances that the jury (or the judge in a bench trial) will
conclude that the prosecution’s evidence fails to establish the defendant’s guilt.
Such a result would put an end to the case without a conviction because the
Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the prosecution from appealing a jury’s
verdict332 (or in a bench trial, the trial judge’s finding333) of not guilty.
Permitting the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s directed verdict of not
guilty does not change the incentives. Police are not likely to terminate their
investigation immediately upon concluding that their evidence is sufficient to
survive a motion for a court-ordered acquittal, nor will the prosecution seek
and present only enough evidence to make a prima facie case, because even if
their assessment of the evidence is correct, and the limited evidence survives a
motion for a directed verdict, the particular jury trying the case (or the judge in
a bench trial) might not make the inferences desired by the prosecution.
Further, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) might credit the evidence
introduced by the accused and render an acquittal,334 thereby ending the case
329. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
330. ENG. LAW COMM’N, CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 156, supra note 11, para. 4.11; see
also NZ LAW COMM’N, REPORT 70, supra note 295, para. 16 (stating that the rule against double
jeopardy promotes investigating thoroughly before trying the original case).
331. Dennis, supra note 95, at 941.
332. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 797 (1969); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671
(1896); see also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 329 (1970) (implied acquittal of charged greater
offense by conviction for lesser offense); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 198 (1957)
(same).
333. See supra note 79.
334. In determining whether the prosecution’s case is sufficient to convict, the trial judge
must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether
“any rational trier of fact could [find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis added); see also LAFAVE ET
AL., supra note 90, § 24.6(c) (outlining the basic standard of review). The jury, on the other
hand, must consider both parties’ evidence, including the witnesses’ credibility; it must also judge
the credibility of the witnesses called by both sides. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (stating that it
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permanently.335 Moreover, evidence thought by the police and prosecutors to
be sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt might be viewed differently by
the trial judge who may end the case without even permitting the jury to
consider the case336 (or, in a bench trial, without requiring the defense to
present its case337) by allowing a defense motion for a court-ordered acquittal.
If the prosecution could appeal such a decision only with leave to appeal, as
provided in the Criminal Justice Act 2003,338 and it was unable to obtain such
leave,339 the trial judge’s ruling would stand, the defendant would be acquitted,
and the prosecution would lose its case.340 Even if the prosecution obtained
leave to appeal, it would have no guarantee that the appellate court, in what
almost by definition would be a “close case,” would find that the trial judge
erred in acquitting the defendant and therefore reverse that ruling.341
Accordingly, even if the prosecution could, by statute or court rule, appeal a
trial judge’s decision to allow a motion for a directed verdict, police and
prosecutors could never be certain that they would get a “second bite at the
apple.”342 As a result, they would have every incentive from the outset to put
forth their best efforts to investigate the crime and convict the defendant.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 changed criminal procedure in England by
allowing the prosecution to appeal a trial judge’s ruling of no case to answer,
i.e., a directed verdict of not guilty, and to retry the defendant for the same
is “the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”); Kansas v.
Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 n.* (2009) (noting that juries determine witness credibility). Thus, the
jury might not believe testimony that otherwise would have proven the prosecution’s case; or
despite the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, the jury might nevertheless find the
defendant not guilty after hearing his evidence, including perhaps his own testimony.
335. See supra notes 68–69, 75–81 and accompanying text.
336. E.g., Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 141–42 (1962) (per curiam).
337. See, e.g., Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 141 (1986) (noting how the trial court
dismissed certain charges as wanting for sufficient evidence).
338. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 57(4) (Eng.).
339. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (outlining a possible standard that courts
could be required to undertake). Under this standard, the Court of Appeal might deny leave to
appeal even if the trial judge erred in concluding that the prosecution’s evidence failed to
establish a prima facie case of guilt.
340. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 58(8)–(9)(a) (providing that the prosecution can
appeal only if it informs the trial court that it agrees the defendant should be acquitted if, inter
alia, “leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal is not obtained”).
341. Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Court of Appeal could reverse the trial judge’s
ruling of no case to answer but still order the defendant acquitted if it concluded that the
defendant could not receive a fair trial if his or her initial trial were resumed or if a fresh trial
were ordered. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, § 61(4)(c), (5).
342. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978).
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offense, or resume his or her initial trial, if the Court of Appeal overturns the
trial judge’s ruling. An argument can be made that, in the United States, a
statute or court rule based upon these provisions of the Act would be consistent
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Massachusetts343 and would
pass constitutional muster under the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, even
if one accepts the argument that the provisions of such a statute or court rule
would not be inconsistent with current case law, an analysis of the policies
underlying the guarantee against double jeopardy reveals that several of those
policies would be thwarted by such a provision.
One of the most important purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to
minimize the ordeal of the trial process.344 Permitting the prosecution to
appeal a trial judge’s court-ordered acquittal frustrates this purpose, because if
the prosecution’s appeal succeeds, the accused will undergo a second trial and
will suffer the embarrassment, distress, and perhaps expense brought about by
that second trial.
Perhaps more importantly, permitting a second trial for the same offense
would increase the risk of erroneously convicting an innocent person.345 This
would undermine a major purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.346
Moreover, convicting an innocent person is of particular concern in the United
States, for it is a “‘fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.’”347
In addition, permitting the prosecution to retry an individual for the same
offense after it successfully appeals a court-ordered acquittal would undermine
two other purposes of the rule against double jeopardy. First, it would frustrate
the rule’s policy348 of conserving scarce prosecutorial and judicial resources.349
Second, it also might cause the public to lose respect for, and confidence in,
the criminal justice system.350
343. Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462 (2005); see also supra notes 154–79 and
accompanying text.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 87, 203–18.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 256–84.
346. See supra notes 88–89, 246–48 and accompanying text (stating that a major purpose of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent the government from trying to persuade a second
fact-finder of the accused’s guilt).
347. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367 n.158 (1972)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (“We believe that it is better for ten guilty people to be set free than for
one innocent man to be unjustly imprisoned.” (quoting William O. Douglas, Foreword to JEROME
FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY at 11, 11–12 (1957))); 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 12,
at *358 (“[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent
suffer.”).
348. See supra notes 92, 309–10 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 318–27 and accompanying text.
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In light of the purposes of the rule against double jeopardy, it is highly
probable that a retrial for the same offense following a prosecutorial appeal of
a trial judge’s midtrial acquittal ruling would violate the guarantee against
double jeopardy. Accordingly, any appeal by the prosecution authorized by
statute or court rule would not serve a “proper purpose” and therefore would be
impermissible under the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.351

351. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986) (declaring that a postacquittal appeal
in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause has no proper purpose and that such an appeal
frustrates the accused’s finality interests).

